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I. Operator Liability, Removal, and Replacement 
The Form JOAs contain remedies for operators against non-operators 
who fail to make timely payment of their share of expenses or otherwise 
default in their obligations. Non-operators typically face a steeper climb 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss2/3
2015]        Form Joint Operating Agreements (Part Two) 167 
  
when challenging the operator, however, particularly when seeking redress 
under the provisions for removal of an operator for failure to carry out its 
duties. Removal of an operator is rightfully seen as a last resort in conflicts 
between operators and non-operators. Litigation over whether certain 
exploration and production activities of an operator constitute a violation of 
the “good and workmanlike” standard have often ended favorably for 
operators. However, questions related to the financial obligations of an 
operator are different.  
A. Exculpatory Clauses 
Exculpatory language in the Form JOAs can significantly limit the 
ability of nonoperators to hold the Operator liable or recover damages.1 The 
operator acts on behalf of the non-operators subject to a “good and 
workmanlike” standard, but is only liable for its actions/omissions in its 
capacity as “Operator” as defined in the JOA only where it acts with “gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.” Questions continue to arise as to exactly 
what conduct by the operator is subject to the exculpatory clause.  
Problem: In 1992, Mustaine Petroleum purchased a 55% working 
interest in the leases comprising the Cold Sweat Prospect from Freidman 
Petroleum, with same leases comprising the Contract Area of a 1982 Form 
JOA. Freidman Petroleum had been the operator of the Cold Sweat 
Prospect since 1952 and during the lifetime of the prospect over 1.6 million 
barrels of oil had been produced. Although required by the terms on the 
JOA, no vote to replace or approve the new operator was made. Not long 
after the assignment to the new de facto operator Mustaine Petroleum, 
however, the cost of operating the wells on the Contract Area rose 
dramatically, and production decreased due to maintenance problems. 
Some non-operators approached Mustaine Petroleum about purchasing its 
interest in the prospect. Meanwhile, Mustaine circulated an AFE to cover 
the costs of proposed maintenance on the wells. The circulation of this AFE 
triggered the ‘consent/non-consent’ option for the non-operators, possibly 
invoking a 300.00% penalty for non-consenters. Some non-operators did 
not consent, did not sign the subsequent AFE, and did not pay any of their 
proportionate shares of the proposed costs, nor even consented to Mustaine 
Petroleum being made the operator. Shortly thereafter, Mustaine Petroleum 
curtailed production to approximately one barrel per day—the minimum to 
hold the leases.  
In the following litigation, the trial court found that the non-operators 
had 1) waived their objection to Mustaine Petroleum being the operator by 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See e.g., Article V.A of the 1989 Form. 
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accepting the benefits of Mustaine Petroleum’s performance (limited 
though those benefits were), and 2) that under the terms of the JOA, the 
operator was not allowed to start any single project costing over $30,000 
unless that project was either connected to drilling, reworking, deepening, 
completing, recompleting, or plugging back of a well which had already 
been authorized pursuant to the JOA. The trial court also found that, 
despite Mustaine Petroleum’s claim, the circulation of the AFE was a 
breach of contract because the work proposed in the AFE was not 
reworking and that due to the initiation of the consent/non-consent option 
through circulation of the AFE and its invocation of the 300% penalty to 
non-operators, the non-operators did in fact suffer damages. On appeal, 
Mustaine Petroleum claimed that even if it was liable for breach of 
contract, the exculpatory clause in Article V.A of the JOA limits its liability 
to gross negligence or willful misconduct. Does the exculpatory clause 
absolve Mustaine Petroleum of liability? 
Perhaps the single most commonly cited operator removal/exculpatory 
clause case is Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg,2 wherein the 
following exculpatory clause found in the 1977 and 1982 Form JOAs was 
considered by the El Paso Court of Appeals:  
“[Operator] …shall conduct and direct and have full control of 
all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by, 
and within the limits of, this agreement. It shall conduct all such 
operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have 
no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained or 
liabilities incurred, except such as may result from gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.”3  
At the district court level, the jury failed to find that the appellant 
operator, Abraxas, had acted with gross negligence and/or willful 
misconduct and that Abraxas’ liability sounded in contract law. The Texas 
Court of Appeals in El Paso, in examining the issue of whether Abraxas 
could therefore be found liable for exemplary damages, found that the 
exculpatory clause in the JOA applies to claims that the operator failed to 
act as a reasonably prudent operator but does not apply to contractual 
claims against the operator arising from failure to comply the terms of the 
JOAs. 
In making this decision, the court of appeals first noted that the 
exculpatory clause was unambiguous and was found in an article that 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Abraxas, 20 S.W.3d at 759. 
 3. Id.  
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concerned the operator’s authority to conduct operations in the Contract 
Area, suggesting an intent by the drafters to limit its applicability to 
operational conduct. More significantly, in the court’s eye, was the fact that 
the operator’s limitation of liability was linked directly to imposition of the 
duty of the operator to act in a reasonably prudent manner—a duty strictly 
concerning the manner in which the operator conducted drilling and 
production operations on the lease. Therefore, the court concluded that the 
exculpatory clause was limited to claims based upon allegations that the 
operator failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator and does not apply to 
a claim that it breached the contractual terms of the JOA.4 
Only a year removed from Abraxas, the Eastland Court of Appeals 
released its aforementioned Cone opinion, holding that the exculpatory 
clause in a 1982 Form only absolves claims that the operator had not acted 
in a good and workmanlike manner with regards to operations. 5 
Contractual breaches of the terms of the JOA were not released. The court 
opined thusly: 
“In the operating agreement, the language which requires a 
showing of gross negligence and willful misconduct immediately 
follows the provision requiring the operator to conduct 
operations in a good and workmanlike manner. [Non-operator’s] 
complaints did not allege the failure of [operator] to operate in a 
good and workmanlike manner. Rather, [Non-operator’s] 
complaints alleged breaches of specific terms of the agreement 
and are in the nature of an accounting. . . . The gross 
negligence/willful misconduct requirement applies to any and all 
claims that the operator failed to conduct operations in a good 
and workmanlike manner. The court in Abraxas Petroleum 
Corporation v. Hornburg reached a similar result in interpreting 
this same clause.”6 
Further cases help define the issues of application of the exculpatory 
clause and the scope of gross negligence and willful misconduct. In 2003, 
the Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals in Texas considered the standards 
required to show gross negligence and willful misconduct. Specifically, in 
IP Petroleum Company, Inc. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C.,7 non-operator 
signatories to a 1956 Form sued in contract claiming that the operator failed 
to reach the target depth and that this constituted gross negligence and/or 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Cone, 68 S.W.3d 147. 
 6. Id. at 155.  
 7. 116 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). 
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willful misconduct. The district court found that the operator’s failure to 
reach the target depth was a result of gross negligence and/or willful 
misconduct.8 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did 
not support the finding that the operator had acted with gross negligence 
and/or willful misconduct and that the exculpatory clause applied to any 
unworkmanlike activity of the operator. The court noted that gross 
negligence required a finding of great malfeasance, rather than just a series 
of smaller errors. 
Also in 2003, another Texas Court of Appeals considered the 
exculpatory clause in Article V of the 1982 Form and opined on whether it 
was limited to claims involving actual operations or whether it also covered 
contractual breaches of the terms of the JOA. In Castle Texas Production 
Ltd. Partnership v. The Long Trusts,9 the trial court found the operator 
liable for breach of contract. The court of appeals agreed, rejecting the 
operator’s argument that the exculpatory clause exonerated any such 
breach, holding:  
“[Operator] attempts to entirely escape liability for breach of 
contract arguing that it cannot be held to have breached the JOAs 
absent proof that it was guilty of “gross negligence or willful 
misconduct,” the standard of care prescribed by Article V.A. of 
the [1982 Form] JOAs. This clause, however, is limited to claims 
that [operator] failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator in 
its operations in the Contract Area and does not apply to a claim 
that it otherwise breached the JOAs.”10  
The exculpatory language in the 1989 Form is subtly different then that 
employed in the 1977 and 1982 Forms, possibly resulting in different 
interpretations as to application. Considering the following: 
Problem: Roth Oil and Anthony Gas were operator and non-operator, 
respectively, to a 1989 Form that covered the mineral interests comprising 
the Duster Unit in Texas. After state authorities broke up the unit for lack of 
production, Anthony Gas sued Roth Oil, claiming that it had failed to 
maintain production in paying quantities, causing oil and gas leases 
potentially worth millions of dollars to expire and the unit to be broken up. 
Roth Oil claimed that the exculpatory clause in Article V.A of the JOA 
absolves it of liability. Is Roth Oil correct?  
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 896-7. (The case does not expressly state the vintage of the JOA form, but the 
language cited is suggestive of a 1956 Form.) 
 9. 134 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied). 
 10. 134 S.W.3d at 283-84. 
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In Wendell Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC,11 a unanimous 2012 
opinion issued by the Texas Supreme Court that compared the exculpatory 
language in the 1977 and 1982 Forms to the corresponding exculpatory 
language in Article V.A of the 1989 Form, the Court found that the operator 
was not liable for its activities under the JOA unless those activities 
involved gross negligence or willful misconduct. In other words, the claims 
of non-operators arising under allegations that the operator failed to conduct 
activities as contractually prescribed by the terms of the JOA was found to 
be precluded by the exculpatory clause.  
In Reeder, the Court considered the case of an operator who faced claims 
by non-operators that it had failed to maintain production in paying 
quantities, causing leases potentially worth millions of dollars to expire and 
the Texas Railroad Commission (the “RRC”) to break apart a unit and 
suspend operations therein. The operations were conducted pursuant to the 
1989 Form. At trial, a jury found the operator had breached its duty to the 
non-operators by failing to maintain production in paying quantities. The 
court of appeals affirmed, and held that the exculpatory clause in the JOA at 
issue should not be applied to shield the operator from the claims of the 
non-operators because the clause did not apply to breach of contract claims 
like the ones before the court. Therefore, it was not necessary that the 
operator first be found to have behaved with either gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. 
The Supreme Court of Texas first noted that, unlike the 1977 and 1982 
Form JOAs that provide “[Operator] shall conduct all such operations in a 
good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability as Operator to 
the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except such as 
may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct,” the 1989 Form 
provides in Article V.A  that “[Operator] shall conduct its activities under 
this agreement as a reasonable prudent operator, in a good and 
workmanlike manner, with due diligence and in accordance with good 
oilfield practice, but in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the 
other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as may 
result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.” (emphasis added)  
Drawing upon the difference between the exculpatory language of “its 
activities under this agreement” in the 1977 and 1982 Forms versus “all 
such operations” in the 1989 Form, and noting that some commentators12 
                                                                                                                 
 11. 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012). 
 12. See Robert Bledsoe, The Operating Agreement: Matters Not Covered or 
Inadequately Covered, 47 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 15.03[1] (2001); see also Wilson 
Woods, The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses in Joint Operating Agreements, 38 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 211, 214-15 (2005). 
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have concluded the 1989 Form provided for a more expansive exoneration 
of the operator, the Court held the 1989 Form’s exculpatory language 
broadened the range of operator activities covered by the exculpatory clause 
outside of those strictly relating to operations under the JOA.  
Specifically, this interpretation of the 1989 Form exculpatory clause 
yields that the clause covers not only basic oilfield operations but also all 
activities covered under the form JOA. The Court opined, “The [1989 form 
JOA exculpatory clause] implicates a broader scope of conduct following 
the language of the contract. The agreed standard exempts the operator 
from liability for its activities unless its liability-causing conduct is due to 
gross negligence or willful misconduct.” After subsequently finding that the 
operator had not acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct, the 
Supreme Court reversed and ruled in favor of the operator.  
The implication of Reeder is that application of the exculpatory clause to 
a failure by the operator to satisfy basic contractual obligations under the 
1989 Form may render such breach not actionable unless the breach rises to 
the level of “gross negligence or willful misconduct,” as determined by the 
fact-finder. It may now be that operators under a 1989 Form will be 
exempted from liability to non-operators if the operator acts with mere 
ordinary negligence. 
B. Gross Negligence and Willful Misconduct 
The definitions of “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct” have 
been heavily scrutinized. Gross negligence is, of course, heightened 
negligence. One commentator has opined that “[g]ross negligence is 
generally defined as the failure to use even slight care.”13 The Texas 
Supreme Court has defined it as “that entire want of care which would raise 
the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of a 
conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the person or persons to be 
affected by it.”14 In the oil and gas context, one court has required the 
plaintiff to show that a defendant “had actual subjective knowledge of an 
extreme risk of serious harm.”15 The risk is considered from a subjective 
point of view—what did the operator know or should have known about the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Andrew Derman, Joint Operating Agreement: A Working Manual, p. 27, White 
Paper, Thompson & Knight, LLP, available at 
http://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/afd3af63-c4d4-429f-8884-
9ef64167b148/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a9271338-00f3-4c77-897f-
d5a53776ca16/Joint%20Operating%20Agreement%20-%20Derman.pdf (last visited May 
23, 2015). 
 14. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex.1981). 
 15. IP Petroleum Co., 116 S.W.3d at 897. 
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magnitude of the risk—with said risk known to the defendant to likely 
result in “extraordinary harm, not the type of harm ordinarily associated 
with breaches of contract or even with bad faith denials of contract rights” 
but instead actual “‘death, grievous physical injury, or financial ruin.’” 
Generally, evidence that the operator had actual subjective knowledge that 
there existed an extreme risk of significant harm but still chose to act must 
be present for a finding of gross negligence in the JOA context.16  
 “Willful misconduct” is similar to gross negligence and Texas courts, at 
least, have not much differentiated the two.17 One commentator has 
suggested that willful misconduct might require a heightened element of 
intent.18 Like gross negligence, a finding of willful misconduct typically 
requires some evidence of “a specific intent…to cause substantial 
injury…”19 
Problem: Ortega Oil, as operator, and Squier Gas, as non-operator, 
executed a 1956 Form covering the mineral interests comprising the Rock 
Me Tonite Video Prospect. The terms of the JOA required Ortega Oil to 
drill to a depth that would allow for testing of a certain prospective 
formation. Ortega Oil drilled to approximately the necessary depth but 
after a rather haphazard open hole completion of the well, it decided to 
plug and abandon the hole. The operator notified the non-operator of the 
abandonment and, per the terms of the JOA, offered to turn control of the 
well over to Squier Gas. Squier Gas, after inspection of the site, believed 
the Ortega Oil had acted with gross negligence and/or willful misconduct 
and brings suit. Is Squier Gas correct? 
In IP Petroleum Co., a Texas court of appeals considered the boundary 
between mere negligence and gross negligence and/or willful misconduct. 
Before the case, the parties had executed a JOA Form requiring the operator 
to drill to a depth necessary to test a specified formation. When the 
borehole approached TD, however, the operator completed the well at what 
it thought was the required depth and announced its intention to plug and 
abandon the hole. Under the terms of the JOA, after this required notice of 
operator’s intention to plug and abandon (“P&A”) the hole, the non-
operators could then either accept the decision or take over the well 
provided they agreed to take on P&A responsibility. The non-operators 
believed, however, that the operator had mis-completed the well and sued. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 22 (Tex. 1994). 
 17. Id. at 11-12, citing IP Petroleum Co., Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 897. 
 18. Jeanine Feriancek, Liability for Negligence?, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 58, 60 
(1996). 
 19. IP Petroleum Co., Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 898. 
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The trial court found the operator had acted with both gross negligence and 
willful misconduct. The court of appeals reserved, finding only ordinary 
negligence and thus the operator was relieved of liability by the JOA’s 
exculpatory clause.   
C. Operator Removal and JOAs with No Removal Provisions  
Very generally speaking, the more recent the vintage Form JOA at issue, 
the greater the likelihood of success for operator removal, especially in 
connection with an operator’s breach of financial obligations. Many custom 
JOAs do not directly address operator removal. Only when the operator 
resigns or sells all of its rights and interests in the Contract Area is 
replacement expressly provided for in the 1956 Form, for example, but the 
only self-help remedies for non-operators seeking to remove an operator 
would be through the courts. As one commentator has suggested, the dearth 
of case law regarding removal of an operator under the 1956 Form may 
suggest how difficult and impractical this avenue would be.20  
Still, however, JOAs that do not expressly provide for the removal of an 
operator are occasionally litigated, often with non-operators losing. In 
Cross Timbers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corporation,21 the Amarillo Court of 
Appeals considered a JOA executed in 1965 which did not cover operator 
removal. In the buildup to the case, the operator was voted out but refused 
to relinquish control. The court refused to overturn the summary judgment 
of the district court in favor of Exxon after finding no express provision in 
the JOA allowing for operator removal and no grounds to imply a right for 
removal.22 The court reasoned that while the JOA gave some rights to the 
non-operators to determine the nature and scope of operations on the 
Contract Area of the JOA, the manner in which those operations were 
actually accomplished were determined solely by the operator. Thus, the 
court determined that allowing for the removal of the operator by the non-
operators would grant the non-operator powers that were not stipulated or 
implied in the JOA.23 One commentator believes that in the absence of a 
removal provision, a court is unlikely to imply one.24 
  
                                                                                                                 
 20. Fabeńe Talbot, Removal and Replacement of the Operator under the Model Forms 
of Joint Operating Agreement, Texas Bar Journal, Vol. 64, April 2001. 
 21. 22 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) 
 22. Id. at 28. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Ernest Smith & John Lowe, The Operator: Liability to Non-operators, Resignation, 
Removal and Selection of a Successor, Special Inst. on Operating Agreements, Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation (2008). 
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D. Operator Removal and JOAs with Removal Provisions  
Exculpatory clauses in the 1977, 1982, and 1989 Forms provide a 
measure of protection for operators. In operator removal cases, these 
clauses pay an important role because, if cause is necessary for operator 
removal, a showing that an operator was negligent (if the JOA contains no 
exculpatory clause) or acts in a grossly negligence manner and/or is guilty 
of willful misconduct (if the JOA does contain an exculpatory clause), the 
operator can be removed. The scope of the protection provided by 
exculpatory clauses has been litigated almost ceaselessly.  
1. “Good Cause” for Removal 
The 1977, 1982, and 1989 Forms all allow non-operators to remove an 
operator for cause provided some due process protocols are followed, with 
the 1977 and 1982 Forms being the most similar. The 1977 and 1982 Forms 
both dictate in Article V.B.1 that the “Operator may be removed if it fails 
or refuses to carry out its duties hereunder…or become insolvent” 
(emphasis added). Whether or not this phrase necessitates the non-operators 
to prove that the operator has been grossly negligent or guilty of willful 
misconduct remains a hotly contested question. 
For example, Article V.A of the 1977 Form also states that the operator 
must conduct itself in a “good and workmanlike manner,” but provides that 
the operator “shall have no liability as operator to the other parties for 
losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except as such may result from gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.” The “good and workmanlike” standard, 
vague to begin with, is therefore fettered with this type of exculpatory 
clause from the 1977 Form forward, which seemingly raises the threshold 
of liability beyond just failing to meet the average workaday standards of 
the oilfield and into the realm of flagrant inattention or recklessness. This 
arguably eliminates mere allegations of breach of contract as grounds for 
removal under the 1977 or 1982 Forms.  
Not surprisingly, most operator removal cases under Form JOAs involve 
difficult arguments over whether actions by an operator were contrary to its 
“good and workmanlike manner” duties—and exactly what those duties are. 
One commentator feels that the reference to “duties” is far wider than 
merely just operating in a “good and workmanlike manner.”25 Other 
commentators have noted that combining a “for clause” removal provision 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Lowe, supra note 38 at 29. 
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with the exculpatory “gross negligence or willful misconduct” language in 
the 1977 and 1982 Forms makes an operator “virtually removal proof.”26  
Indeed, in Texas, many of these removal cases involving the 1977 and 
1982 Form are now won by the operator, but not always. In Stine v. 
Marathon Oil Co.,27 a federal court of appeals interpreted the 1977 Form28 
exculpatory clause, opining, “The clause at issue is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous. The clause provides that the Operator ‘shall conduct all such 
operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability 
as Operator to the other parties ... except such as may result from gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.’29 It is clear to us that the protection of 
the exculpatory clause extends not only to ‘acts unique to the operator,’ as 
the district court expressed it, but also to any acts done under the authority 
of the JOA ‘as Operator.’ This protection clearly extends to breaches of the 
JOA.”30 More significantly, in the court’s eye, was the fact that the 
operator’s limitation of liability was linked directly to imposition of the 
duty of the operator to act in a reasonably prudent manner—a duty strictly 
concerning the manner in which the operator conducted drilling and 
production operations on the lease. Therefore, the court concluded that the 
exculpatory clause was limited to claims based upon an allegation that the 
operator failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator and does not apply to 
a claim that it breached the contractual terms of the JOA.31 
The 1989 Form further refines the operator’s standard of conduct and 
allows a non-operator to seek removal “for good cause by the affirmative 
vote of non-operators owning a majority interest based on ownership…after 
excluding the voting interest of operator.” The “fails or refuses to carry out 
its duties” language from the 1977 and 1982 Forms is removed. “Good 
cause” is defined to be “not only gross negligence or willful misconduct but 
also the material breach of or inability to meet the standards of operator 
contained in Article V.A or material failure or inability to perform its 
obligations under this Agreement.”32 While this has been interpreted by at 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Brian Bjella, Removing the Operator Under the Joint Operating Agreement: 
Breaking Up is Hard to Do, 45 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11-1, 11-21 (1999). 
 27. 976 F.2d 254, 260 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 28. The case does not make certain whether the Form JOA being litigated was the 1977 
or 1982 form, but since it was apparently executed in early to mid-1982 (see Stine at 256-7), 
before the 1982 Form JOA was in wide release, the author believes it to be the 1977 Form 
JOA. The language cited appears identical.  
 29. Id. at 260. (Emphasis in opinion.)  
 30. Id. at 261. (Interestingly, the AAPL 1989 Model Form language is very similar to 
the language cited by the Stine court.)  
 31. Id. 
 32. 1989 Form art. V.B.1. 
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least one court as an easier standard to meet in order to achieve operator 
removal than “gross negligence or willful misconduct,”33 operator removal 
under the 1989 Form for “gross negligence or willful misconduct” can still 
be an uphill battle for most non-operators when the focus is on arguments 
related to “good and workmanlike manner.”  
2. Removal for Failure to Meet Financial Obligations 
Article VII.D.1 of the 1989 Form provides that any party’s rights under 
the JOA may be suspended for failure to meet financial obligations—and 
such failure is not expressly subject to any exculpatory clause. The right to 
suspend a party’s rights under Article VII.D.1 can be exercised thirty (30) 
days after written notice of default. If, however, the defaulting party is the 
operator, the non-operators have the right by vote to appoint a new operator 
“effective immediately,” without reference to a cure period for the 
operator’s default.  
Two cases in Texas involving operator removal that apply the terms of 
the Form JOAs illustrate a path to remove an operator who has failed to 
meet its financial obligations under the JOA. Tri-Star Petroleum Company 
v. Tipperary Corporation34 was an accelerated appeal from a temporary 
injunction issued by the district court in Midland requiring Tri-Star to 
relinquish its status as operator and prohibited interference with the 
successor operator’s assumption of control while the non-operators sought a 
final judicial determination regarding operator removal from a project in 
Australia covered with a 1977 Form.35 Unhappy with both the operator’s 
accounting and field activities, the non-operator had voted to remove the 
operator and then voted to replace it with new operator named Tipperary, 
who then obtained a temporary injunction requiring Tri-Star to pass 
operational control to it. Tri-Star filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal 
challenging the temporary injunction, arguing both that a judicial decision 
                                                                                                                 
 33. R. & R. Resources Corporation v. Echelon Oil and Gas, L.L.C., 2006 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 326 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) No. 03–05–00479–CV 2006 WL 66458 
(unreported opinion) 
 34. 101 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. denied). In the case underlying the 
injunction, non-operators originally sought operator removal from a project in Australia, 
alleging the operator had failed to (i) conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner 
under Article V of the 1982 Form and (ii) fulfill its duties under Article VII.D by improperly 
assessing charges in the joint account of the JOA, commingling funds in the joint account, 
inexplicitly classifying and reclassifying amounts billed to the joint account, failing to 
provide timely and proper adjustments for surpluses in the foreign exchange account of the 
JOA, and double-charging non-operators on cash calls and billings. 
 35. Tri-Star Petroleum involved a Texas-based operator and Australian non-operators 
attempting to develop a 2.3 million acre coalbed methane project in Australia.  
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was a condition precedent to remove an operator and that the temporary 
injunction could not have been made without a showing that the operator 
had failed to perform its duties.  
Temporary injunctions require the prevailing party to show a probable 
right to recovery and probable injury if relief is denied. The time that the 
injunction becomes effective is important because the positions of the 
parties will be frozen at that instance in time for the duration of the 
injunction. Injunctions are used to maintain the status quo at the last 
peaceable, non-contested moment in time. The injunction in Tri-Star had 
been granted by the district court thirty days after the non-operators voted 
to remove the operator due to its alleged failure to conduct operations in a 
good and workmanlike manner, assessing of improper charges, 
commingling of funds, and double-charging for cash calls. The court 
therefore found the last peaceable non-contested status was thirty days after 
the vote of the non-operators to replace the operator, despite litigation 
existing before the vote. This means the status quo enforced by the 
injunction was that point after the vote where the operator had been 
removed by the terms of the JOA. The injunction therefore did not remove 
the old operator—it made it recognize the new operator. 
The court of appeals rejected the operator’s defense that the gross 
negligence standard should apply, at least in the case of a temporary 
injunction for financial failures.36 This reasoning maneuvers around what 
had been a significant hurdle in past operator removal cases—proving the 
operator had acted in a grossly negligent manner.  
In R. & R. Resources Corporation v. Echelon Oil and Gas, L.L.C.,37 the 
operator appealed the grant of a temporary injunction, disallowing it from 
opposing the designation of a new operator after being voted out for failing 
to meet financial obligations under Articles V.A and VII.D.1 of the 1989 
Form. The non-operators were unhappy with the accounting and operations 
of operator. Three non-operators, allegedly representing a majority of the 
working interest covered by the JOA, voted to remove the operator for 
“good cause” and to appoint a new operator. The operator refused to step 
aside, causing the non-operators to obtain a temporary injunction against 
the operator. 
On appeal by the operator, the court upheld the granting of a temporary 
injunction, citing both Tipperary and the 1989 Form for the rule that 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 590.  
 37. R. & R. Resources Corporation concerned an operator that failed to meet its 
financial obligations because it was billing non-operators for expenses incurred at least two 
months earlier and delaying paying expenses for several months despite its ability to pay 
them when they were due. 
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“[f]ailure to make prompt adjustments to an operating account and 
improperly assessed charges … have been bases for finding that an operator 
‘failed or refused to carry out its duties.’” 
This decision seemed to expand the definition of “good cause” under the 
JOA past mere gross negligence or willful misconduct to include a material 
breach of or the inability to perform the operator’s duties described in the 
JOA. With regards to the facts presented, the court found the operator had 
made inappropriate charges to the operating account and had failed to 
account promptly for charges to the operating account.38 
The R. & R. Resources case also highlights the importance of 
assignments of working interests while maintaining voting rights under the 
JOA. After the execution of the JOA, the three non-operators which voted 
to remove the operator assigned some of their working interest to other 
parties via participation and subscription agreements which stipulated that 
the voting authority under the JOA was retained by the assignors. The court 
first had to analyze the participation and subscription agreements and 
decide if the assignors had retained voting authority in the first place. The 
case would likely have been decided differently if the court had found that 
the voting rights had been assigned in addition to the working interest, 
because a majority of the working interest—after discounting the working 
interest of the operator—may not have been present, thus invalidating the 
vote.  
Many states have an agency that permits and keeps track of the status of 
operatorship. In Texas, removal of the operator requires the new operator to 
provide written notification to the RRC using a P-4 form acknowledging 
the new operator’s responsibilities, which is also to be acknowledged by the 
former operator. If the former operator refuses to sign the P-4 form and the 
new operator wishes to assume official operatorship in the eyes of the RRC, 
the new operator can file the P-4, unsigned by the former operator, along 
with an explanatory letter and documents showing the right to operate the 
property. Prior to approval of such an application, the RRC will notify the 
last known operator of record of its right to be heard. As indicated in R. & 
R. Resources, if the current operator refuses to sign the P-4 or resign its 
operatorship, the RRC will most likely not decide the issue, but allow the 
matter to be decided by judicial determination. 
At this point, litigation is most likely required to remove the current 
operator and resolve the dispute. A temporary restraining order or 
temporary injunction can be the first step. The injunctive relief sought can 
include both prohibiting the former operator from interfering with the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. R. & R. Resources at 338. 
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successor operator’s duties and from continuing to conduct operations 
under the JOA, among other prohibited actions. Under certain 
circumstances, the temporary relief can include incidental mandatory 
actions on the part of the former operator, such as allowing access to 
records of joint operations. As the court showed in R. & R. Resources, a 
trial court granting such temporary relief is acting within its reasonable 
discretion if it believes that operator’s actions, including accounting and 
reporting practices with regards to the operating account, do not measure up 
to the “good cause” standard in the JOA. 
3. Operator Removal for the 1977 and 1982 Forms vs. the 1989 Form 
The 1977 and 1982 Forms both provide that the operator shall conduct 
operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but that it shall have no 
liability as operator to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities 
incurred, except such as may result from gross negligence or willful 
misconduct.  
Problem: Dexter Gas, as operator, and Noodles Oil and K Petroleum, 
as non-operators, executed a 1977 Form JOA covering oil and gas leases 
comprising the Messed Up Prospect. Dexter Gas owned an undivided 70% 
of the prospect, while the non-operators each owned an undivided 15%. 
Later, Noodles Oil and K Petroleum sought to remove Dexter Gas as 
operator by vote. Are they successful?  
The 1977 and 1982 Forms vary slightly, however, in the voting 
procedures. Article V.B.1 of the 1977 Form requires for removal of 
operator “the affirmative vote of two (2) or more Non-operators owning a 
majority interest based on ownership as shown in Exhibit “A”, and not on 
the number of parties remaining after excluding the voting interest of the 
Operator.”39 Article V.B.1 of the 1982 Form requires for removal of 
operator “the affirmative vote of two (2) or more Non-Operators owning a 
majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit “A” remaining 
after excluding the voting interest of Operator.”  
In addition to the problem faced by a lone non-operator that cannot seek 
redress because of the two vote minimum, the difference in wording in the 
second clause between the 1977 and 1982 Forms was apparently meant to 
avoid allowing an operator with a majority interest to avoid completely a 
vote of removal, but the wording still is not completely clear.  
Removal of an operator under Article V of the 1989 Form requires two 
votes, one for the removal of the operator and another to select a successor 
                                                                                                                 
 39. AAPL 1977 Form art. V.B.1. Emphasis added.  
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operator. In practice, this might be accomplished by a combined ballot. 
Specifically, The operator may be removed, after notice or default and an 
opportunity to cure, by an affirmative vote of a majority in interest of the 
Non-operators based on the interests shown on Exhibit for “good cause.” 
The 1989 Form provides that a successor operator is selected by the 
affirmative vote of two or more parties that, between them, own a majority 
share of the assets as described in Exhibit A. A removed operator cannot 
vote to succeed itself, but that does not necessarily mean it cannot vote for a 
successor. If the operator owns a large interest or there are only two 
signatories to the JOA, then it may be impossible to select a successor 
operator, possibly necessitating a court order.40 Until a successor operator is 
elected, the previous operator must continue in that role. 
Industry practice seems to be that one non-operator with a small minority 
interest can remove an operator with a large majority interest, assuming it 
has a “good cause” and that there are no custom “other provisions” to the 
contrary. This potentially has some interesting results: consider the example 
of three parties to a JOA: an operator with 98.0% working interest, and two 
non-operators each with 1.0% working interests. The non-operators seek to 
remove the operator through the mechanisms of the Article V.B.1 of the 
1989 Form. The non-operators could remove the operator as, after 
removing the 98% interest, the non-operators would own 100% of the 
remaining working interest. Given that this would mean the non-operating 
owners of very small interests could unilaterally remove an operator if their 
“good cause” argument stood, this could be an undesired result. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the change in wording does not 
go far enough and that the interest of the non-operators is not increased on a 
pro-rata basis after removing the working interest of the operator. No 
mention of a pro-rata or proportionate increase is made, unlike in other 
portions of the JOA where increases in the interest of parties after removal 
of interests of others in contemplated, such as in the calculations of the 
interest of consenting parties in Article VI.B.2.(a) of the 1982 and 1989 
Form JOAs. 
To the author’s knowledge, no court has spoken to these interpretations, 
but a custom provision in Article XVI of the 1989 Form that makes clear 
the definition of “majority interest” as used in Article V.B.1 means either a 
fifty percent (50.0%) or more interest in all the working interests listed in 
Exhibit “A,” including that of the operator, or that the interests of the non-
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 577 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied). 
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operators is proportionately increased in the event of a removal, may be 
considered. 
4. Operator Removal When JOA is “Subject to” Other Agreements 
What if the JOA provides for operator removal but is made expressly 
subject to another instrument, such as a farmout agreement, that does not 
contemplate removal? Consider the following scenario: 
Problem: After a contentious series of events, Ballamy Production was 
removed as operator under a Form JOA and replaced with Howard Oil. 
While removal was conducted correctly according to the express terms of 
the JOA, the entire project from which the JOA sprang originated from a 
farmout agreement that contained language that (1) named Ballamy 
Production as operator and (2) established primacy of the farmout in any 
event that the terms of the farmout and JOA conflicted.   
In Inex Industries, Inc. v. Alpar Resources, Inc.,41 the Amarillo Court of 
Appeals considered whether operator removal may be precluded in 
instances where the JOA is expressly made subject to other agreements that 
do not provide for operator removal and that prevail in the event of a 
conflict of terms. Inex involved an operator that was granted a temporary 
injunction by the district court against a successor operator that wanted to 
take over operations.42 In upholding the injunction, the court held that the 
original operator had furnished a probable right of recovery and agreed with 
the original operator that a farmout agreement that provided that the 
original operator “shall serve as Operator of the wells” and that the “this 
[farmout agreement] shall be controlling over the Operating Agreement in 
the event of conflicting provisions” overrode the operator removal clause in 
the JOA.43 
5. Assignments by Operator and Operator Removal 
Case law in Texas indicates that an election of a successor operator is 
triggered upon assignment of the current operator’s interest.44 Can the 
operator avoid removal by assigning a significant part of its working 
interest to a wholly owned subsidiary who will vote against removal? 
                                                                                                                 
 41. 717 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1986, no writ). 
 42. Id. at 687. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Abraxas, 20 S.W.3d at 750 (“As found by the trial court, [operator’s] sale of its 
interest to Abraxas resulted in its resignation as operator pursuant to Article V.B.1, thereby 
invoking Article V.B.2’s requirement that a successor operator be selected from the parties 
owning an interest in the Contract Area.”) 
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Problem: Yorke Petroleum was the unit operator of the Creepy Project, 
which was comprised of leases joined together under a unit operating 
agreement. Greenwood Gas and O’Brien Oil were non-operators. The 
principles of Yorke Petroleum got news that the non-operators were 
planning on removing Yorke as operator. They decided to transfer almost 
all of Yorke Petroleum’s interest to a new subsidiary, Selway Operating. 
The idea then was to have Selway Operating vote against operator removal, 
something Yorke was not allowed to do itself per the express terms of the 
JOA. Will such a maneuver work?  
In Penmark Resources Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm’n,45 the 
court ruled that the subsidiary was not an eligible working interest owner 
for operator removal voting purposes because it was controlled by the 
operator. The court opined that the working interest owners who were 
trying to remove the operator did not have to prove that the transfer of the 
working interest to the subsidiary was a sham transaction or that the 
subsidiary was the alter ego of its parent company.46 The court focused 
instead on the corporate structure of the operator and subsidiary, pointing 
out that while the record showed that the legal formalities were observed in 
that separate tax numbers and tax payments were made by the operator and 
the new entity, overwhelming evidence existed that the subsidiary was an 
instrumentality of the existing operator.47 
On a broader note then, can the assignee of the original operator vote at 
all when designating a subsequent operator? Consider the following 
scenario: 
Problem: Chamberlain Gas, operator, found itself at odds with non-
operators Corgan Corporation and Iha Oil regarding the Chimera 
Prospect, a group of leases covered by a 1989 Form. Chamberlain Gas 
decided to step down as operator and to assign its interest to D’arcy 
Energy. Corgan Corporation and Iha Oil both wanted to be operator. In the 
subsequent vote to decide which company will be the new operator, can 
D’arcy Energy vote for one of the non-operators simply to keep the other 
from attaining operatorship? Can it vote for itself to be operator?  
                                                                                                                 
 45. 6 P.3d 1076 (Okla.Civ.App. 2000). 
 46. Id. at 181. 
 47. Id. at 182. (The court noted the two entities were created for the same purpose, had a 
common board of directors, common street address, and that the subsidiary had no 
employees but paid the parent company a monthly fee for using its employees, who were 
subject to the parent company’s control.) 
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Little case law speaks to this, but Article V.B.2 of the 1989 Form JOA 
excludes the original operator’s vote when the operator is removed or 
resigns—and provides that the successor operator must be picked from the 
parties owning an interest in the Contract Area at the time the successor is 
selected. On the other hand, two commentators believe that the successor 
owner of the operator’s interest should be allowed to vote.48 The timing of 
the operator’s resignation, the assumption by the assignee of the interest, 
and the selection of the new operator by parties to the JOA is key. One 
possible way around this conundrum is that, as a condition of purchase, the 
(potential) successor owner of the original operator’s interest requires that 
the original operator hold a vote before the assignment naming the 
successor owner the new operator.49 Of course, such an issue could be 
addressed in the custom provisions of the JOA in the first place.   
II. Liability for Costs Of Operations 
Unless changed by other provisions in the JOA, all costs and liabilities 
incurred in operations under Form JOAs are typically borne and paid by the 
parties in the percentages of their ownership of the Contract Area.50 The 
ownership percentages are typically listed in Exhibit A.51 This ownership is 
sometimes parsed out with different percentages for “before payout” 
(“BPO”) and “after payout” (“APO”). Often times, a broker or geologist 
will be carried at 0.0% ownership BPO and “back-in” at some ownership 
percentage APO, helping to avoid exploration and development costs. In 
the same manner, the operators and non-operators own all production, 
subject to payment of royalties and other burdens on production, by such 
percentages, typically regardless of which party has contributed a particular 
property or where a well is located.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 48. C. Barry Osborne and Linda Featherstone. 12 Commonly Overlooked, 
Underappreciated and/or Screwed Up Transition Issues That Can Ruin Your Whole Day (or 
Deal), Paper #6 of the proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute annual 
symposium (2006). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., AAPL 1989 Form art. III.B. 
 51. Landman friends of the author pass along their wish for lawyers to always list and 
describe all properties in Exhibit A of JOAs (and other instruments, usually) with Exhibit A 
subdivided for various property types.     
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A. Limitations on Expenditures and Liabilities of the Parties 
1. Limitations on Expenditures 
The Form JOAs typically require updates on expenditures at regular 
intervals. For example, according to Article V.D.8 of the 1989 Form, the 
operator is required to send an estimate of both current and cumulative 
costs incurred at “reasonable” intervals. Often times, the estimated price on 
the AFE is exceeded, sometimes by a wide margin.   
Problem: Downing Oil and Tipton Gas agreed to drill a wildcat in the 
Judas prospect. Downing Oil, as the operator, circulated an AFE for the 
well. Tipton Gas received the AFE before operations were commenced. As 
drilling progressed, Tipton Gas grew concerned about the cost and time of 
development and eventually sent a letter to Downing Oil stating that it 
elected to “automatically” go non-consent when the estimated drilling 
costs in the AFE were reached by actual costs. Sure enough, the estimated 
costs of the AFE were reached by actual costs before the target depth was 
penetrated. Downing Oil continued drilling and accruing expenses, 
eventually reached the target horizon, and then—finding the hole dry—shut 
it in, accruing plugging and abandonment costs. Tipton Gas announced 
that it owed nothing after the point in time that it believed it had 
“automatically” gone non-consent. Downing Oil and the other working 
interest owners brought an action against Tipton Gas for its proportionate 
share of the costs that were accrued after Tipton Gas claimed it 
“automatically” went non-consent. What result? 
In M&T, Inc. v. Fuel Resources Development Co.,52 M&T was an 
operator owning a 56.25% undivided interest in the Contract Area as 
defined in a 1956 Form executed in 1973, while non-operators McBride and 
Fuel Resources owned 18.75% and 25% undivided interests, respectively. 
While M&T was drilling a well in Jackson County, Colorado, Fuel 
Resources stopped paying its share of the development costs. M&T and 
McBride continued to pay while the hole was drilled to the targeted total 
depth, and plugged and abandoned in the Dakota-Lakota formation. 
$150,927 in costs were left unpaid by Fuel Resources. In response to 
M&T’s subsequent claim, Fuel Resources argued that it did not agree to 
pay any overruns and could therefore go non-consent in the middle of 
operations as the drilling costs were too high because the AFE set a ceiling 
on operation costs. A Colorado court examined the tentative nature of joint 
operating agreements and opined: 
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 “It is axiomatic that drilling costs cannot be estimated with 
certainty and that an AFE is at best a good-faith estimate. AFE’s 
are usually exceeded, often by very substantial amounts…In the 
oil and gas industry, it is understood and accepted that when one 
signs an AFE, he is committed to his proportionate share of the 
necessary costs in drilling to the objectives specified in the AFE, 
unless the parties mutually agree to terminate drilling earlier or 
to attempt a completion at a shallower formation.”53 
The court went on to rule that an AFE does not set a cap and that the 
parties who sign an AFE are required to pay their proportionate share of the 
cost overruns.  
In order to limit exposure to such overruns, a signatory of a JOA may 
want to either get such a limit agreed upon in writing before signing a 
particular AFE or to include in the custom terms of the JOA a clause that 
absolves non-operators who execute an AFE of the responsibility to pay 
further costs after the estimated costs of a project are exceeded by actual 
costs by a certain percentage, say 125%. In the absence of such contract 
modification, non-operators can typically challenge the costs assessed them 
by the operator only if the costs were incurred in bad faith or are excessive, 
unreasonable, or unauthorized by the AFE. In True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp.,54 the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected an argument that the 
operator was required to drill the well “at cost” and that the operator’s 
affiliated companies were not entitled to profits for the services and 
equipment they had furnished. The court pointed out that the operator could 
have contracted out drilling and other services to nonaffiliated companies 
and in at least one instance had done so. “[C]ompetitive rates were what 
was mutually contemplated [under the parties’ agreement]. Under these 
circumstances … the fiduciary duty to be met by True Oil [the operator] 
was to obtain drilling and related services at a reasonable cost as reflected 
by competitive rates.”55  
2. Cost Overruns 
Problem: Rabin Gas and Howe Operating were operator and non-
operator, respectively, to a 1989 Form covering all the leaseholds in the 
Duster-in-the-Wind prospect. Rabin Gas proposed to drill a well. Howe 
Operating consented. Three years passed while Rabin Gas tried to get the 
necessary permits to drill. Finally, permits secured, Rabin Gas again 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 289. 
 54. 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo.1989). 
 55. Id. at 793. 
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proposed drilling the same well and Howe Operating again consented. The 
second proposal’s estimate on drilling costs was higher than the first and 
assumed that Rabin Gas will conduct drilling and completion operations 
twenty-four hours a day. Soon, however, Howe Operating noticed that 
actual expenses were far more than the estimates it agreed to in the second 
proposal, primarily because Rabin Gas was only operating during daylight 
hours due to, it claims, equipment limitations. Howe Operating notified 
Rabin Gas that it was going non-consent and refused to pay any costs 
associated with the present operation. A lawsuit followed, with Rabin Gas 
seeking foreclosure on Howe Operating’s interest and with Howe 
Operating counter-claiming that Rabin Gas had materially breached the 
terms of the JOA, absolving it of the obligation to pay. Who prevails?  
In July 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Elm Ridge 
Exploration Co., LLC v. Engle,56 a claim for the recovery of drilling 
expenses in New Mexico. Fred Engle was a non-operator to a Form JOA 
executed in 1992.57 Through a series of assignments, Elm Ridge 
Exploration Company, LLC became successor operator under the JOA.  
After a three year delay in acquiring the necessary permits in order to 
drill the well, Elm Ridge re-notified Engle of its intent to drill the well with 
a higher estimated cost. Engle again chose to participate. While the 
estimated cost of the well was calculated assuming that operations would 
proceed around the clock, the well was in fact drilled only during daylight 
hours, quickly increasing costs past the estimate. Engle refused to pay his 
share of the increased cost of the well. In response, Elm Ridge filed a 
complaint seeking foreclosure against Engle for allegedly defaulting on his 
obligation to pay his share of the drilling expenses in state court. Engle 
counterclaimed, alleging that, because Elm Ridge had breached the terms of 
the JOA, Engle should not have to pay for unauthorized expenses that Elm 
Ridge incurred. Engle removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Mexico.  
The district court found that Engle was responsible for his share of the 
costs of the well that were not attributable to Elm Ridge’s breach of the 
JOA terms and that Elm Ridge was entitled to a foreclosure order. Both 
Engle and Elm Ridge appealed to the Tenth Circuit wherein Engle 
contended that, when parties do not share fiduciary duties, excuse of 
performance should extend to a substantial (even if not material) breach of 
a contract by the other party. Therefore, Engle argued he should be excused 
from paying any share of the drilling expenses because Elm Ridge 
                                                                                                                 
 56. 721 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 57. Language cited in the case suggests that a 1989 Form is at issue. 
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substantially breached the JOA when it resorted to the more expensive 
daylight-only operations without Engle’s consent.  
While Elm Ridge did not contest that it substantially breached the JOA 
because of the daylight-only operations, it contended that Engle was 
obligated to pay his share of the drilling expenses because the daylight 
operations had not harmed Engle. More specifically, Elm Ridge claimed 
that had it secured 24-hour rig operations pursuant to the cost estimate it 
had sent Engle, such operations would have been more expensive because 
of different permitting requirements. The court was not persuaded, noting 
testimony from trial showing that Elm Ridge could have waited for a 24-
hour rig to become available without jeopardizing the drilling permit it had 
already obtained. Furthermore, the court noted that in the past, Elm Ridge 
would only spud wells using a daylight rig to preserve its drilling permit, 
finishing the well once a 24-hour rig was available.  
Ultimately, the court affirmed that, although Elm Ridge had substantially 
breached the JOA, it did not materially breach the JOA.58 Therefore, 
Engle’s consent in participating in the drilling of the well and his implied 
acceptance of the drilling expenses were controlling. The court also 
affirmed, however, that Engle was only responsible for his share of the 
costs of the well that were not attributable to Elm Ridge’s breach of the 
JOA.  
B. Defenses to Claims for Payment  
As seen above, parties typically are each obligated to pay their share of 
the costs of an operation to which they consented even if those costs 
significantly exceed original estimates. One reason for this prevailing view 
seems to be courts’ recognition that parties to JOAs are (or should be) 
sophisticated enough to know that oil and gas operations involve risk and 
that sometimes projects end up costing (far) more than the estimates.59 In 
certain circumstances, however, parties have successfully challenged this 
presumed obligation, particularly if the operator conducts operations in a 
way clearly different from the procedure prescribed in the approved AFE. 
                                                                                                                 
 58. The court of appeals did not discuss the definitions of “substantially” and 
“materially” and how they differ, but noted both parties agreed to a jury instruction that a 
material breach by Elm Ridge would discharge Engle of performance but did not include 
discharge of performance for a substantial breach by Elm Ridge. 
 59. One commentator has suggested a sort of “rubes” defense” should exist where an 
operator that has heavily promoted a project to unsophisticated parties should only be able to 
collect the cost estimate in the AFE. See Robert Bledsoe, Problem Areas in Drafting 
Operating Agreements—Some Suggested Solutions, ADV. OIL, GAS & MIN. L. COURSE, State 
Bar of Texas (1981).  
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1. Breach of Terms of AFE 
Problem: Zander Gas, as operator, and Carlos Oil, as non-operator, 
executed a JOA covering the leaseholds and fee minerals comprising the 
Downer Prospect. Zander Gas sent out an AFE for drilling a well with 
terms that provided that drilling would be conducted under a turnkey 
drilling contract. Carlos Oil consented. The well was instead drilled with a 
day-rate contract and ended up costing much more than the estimate in the 
AFE. Carlos Oil refused to pay. Zander Gas sued. What result? 
The aforementioned Haas case60 considered just such a scenario.61 The 
court disallowed the operator to recover for the cost overage attributable to 
the change from, in that case, the footage basis provided for in the AFE to 
the day-rate cost used in reality.  
2. Fraud and Misrepresentation 
Problem: Waters Oil convinced Gilmour Gas, Mason Production, and 
Wright Petroleum to invest in a water-flood scheme at the Sorrow Prospect. 
Waters Oil portrayed this investment as low risk and high yield, citing a 
nearby successful water-flood project (although no Waters Oil personnel 
had actually investigated the effort, expertise, geology, time involved, or 
details of the process that involved in the neighboring water-flood). Waters 
Oil claimed that the project would be conducted in a formation that has 
already proved its prospective nature. In a momentary lapse of reason, the 
other three companies invested in exchange for a 5.0% working interest in 
the leases, executed a 1989 Form that named Waters Oil as operator, and 
agreed to share costs and production. Sure enough, after two years of 
‘flooding,’ the lease produced next to nothing except JIBs. Waters Oil 
decided to plug and abandon the well. The non-operators each refused to 
pay their share. Waters sued each for their proportionate share of the costs. 
What result? 
In Barn v. Maloney,62 the court found that the operator’s fraud induced 
the non-operators to participate. “After a careful consideration of the entire 
record before us, we are forced to the conclusion that [operator’s] 
unqualified statements that ‘We are working . . . on a sandbar development 
that has already proven its merit’ and that ‘Risk is minimal…’ were false 
statements of material facts which, under the circumstances, amounted to 
fraud as defined above. We also conclude that his failure to mention the gas 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Please see page 20 of Part One of this article.  
 61. Haas, 484 S.W.2d 127. 
 62. 516 P.2d 1328 (Okla. 1973). 
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cap and the possible necessity of filling it with water before flood effect 
would occur, as indicated by the ‘experience record of Shell’ which was 
common knowledge in the area and the failure to mention the unplugged 
wells in the immediate area that permitted loss of water and pressure, 
amounted to a concealment of material facts that he was bound under the 
circumstances to disclose.”63 The court held that under the circumstances, 
even if the operator had followed all the procedures of the JOA related to 
AFEs and JIBs, it could not charge for costs overruns because it 
deliberately understated projected drilling costs in order to induce the non-
operators to consent to the project. 
A brace of commentators have also suggested that an operator that 
negligently drafts an AFE so that the negligence can be shown to have 
resulted in an underestimation of costs may result in the challenging parties 
being excused from paying.64 Litigating such an argument would seemingly 
be fact intensive and difficult. 
3. Changes in the Operation 
As discussed above, within both JOAs and AFEs are provisions that 
require the party or parties proposing subsequent operations to ask the other 
parties whether or not they would like to participate in the operation. As 
petroleum engineers and geologists know, however, projects specifics can 
quickly change as new information is made available. What happens when 
an operation is modified after requests for consents are sent out? 
Problem: Harris Oil, as operator, and Dickenson Gas, as non-operator, 
executed a JOA covering the leaseholds and fee minerals comprising the 
Alan Parsons Prospect. Along with the AFE, Harris Oil delivered to 
Dickenson Gas geologic maps detailing the location of nearby drilling sites 
and the proposed location of the new well. Also included was a cost 
estimate of one million dollars. Later—and without notice to Dickenson 
Gas—Harris Oil geologists decided that another site, about 1,500 feet from 
the first site, was a better location to drill. Upon drilling on the new site, 
however, the drillstem ran into a zone of unexpected metamorphic rock that 
drives up the actual costs to 1.5 million dollars—50% higher than the 
estimate. Dickenson Gas sought rescission of the JOA and the related 
exploration agreement reasoning that it was not informed of the new 
location before drilling and of the cost overruns after spudding. Harris Oil 
argued the original well location was just an estimate and that it could 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 1332. 
 64. SMITH AND WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS, supra note 2 at § 17.3[C][1]. 
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move the site a reasonable distance given a good scientific reason. Who 
wins? 
In Palace Exploration Company v. Petroleum Development Company,65 
the non-operator/petitioner was an investor in an oil and gas well. The 
operator/respondent was an Oklahoma oil and gas exploration corporation. 
Both parties entered into an exploration agreement and JOA (form vintage 
unstated) to develop a prospect in Oklahoma. The operator faxed 
information of the two prospects to the investor, including the location of 
nearby wells and a proposed drilling site. An AFE was signed by the 
petitioner/investor estimating the cost of the project at $280,000. After 
determining that the geologic information on one of the maps sent to the 
investor was mistaken, the operator shifted the drilling location by 1,600 ft 
but did not mention the change to the investor. Upon drilling in the new 
location, the operator encountered more water-bearing strata than 
anticipated, requiring the use of specialized drilling mud that resulted in an 
increase in the estimated drilling costs to $378,057.   
Petitioner brought an action seeking rescission of the JOA and the 
exploration agreement. One issue raised on appeal was whether sufficient 
evidence existed to establish that the operator had not committed 
constructive fraud under Oklahoma law when it failed to disclose a change 
in well location before commencement of drilling. The court ruled that 
evidence was sufficient to prove that the respondent had not committed 
constructive fraud. During the jury trial, an expert witness for the 
respondent had testified that the point that marked the drilling location on 
the geological structure map was only a tentative estimation of where the 
final drilling location would be. The court of appeals ruled that the jury’s 
subsequent decision—finding that the changing of the drilling location by 
1,600 ft from the position located on the map was not fraud—was 
reasonable based on the evidence and expert witness testimony presented at 
trial. 
Article VI.B.1 of the 1989 Form requires any party in the JOA to notify 
all the other parties to the agreement of its intention to drill, rework, 
sidetrack, deepen, recomplete, or plug back any well within the Contract 
Area. The party proposing a new well is required to specify the work to be 
performed, the proposed depth, and the location of the hole. Palace 
Exploration suggests that the operator of the new operation continues to 
have considerable leeway concerning the location of the well, rework zone, 
or final production zone—at least if it has sound technical evidence to back 
up the location change. Therefore, if Article VI.B.1 (or a clause like it) does 
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not pinpoint the exact location of the well as that laid out in the drilling 
proposal, those who want the location of the well to be the exact location of 
the proposed well might consider an addition provision either requiring a 
change in location to be approved by the participating parties or a clause 
simply disallowing a location change from that described in the drilling 
proposal.  
4. Lack of Contractual Privity  
Problem: Cornell Oil and Cameron Gas were the non-operators and 
Sheppard Production the operator to a JOA over leaseholds and fee 
minerals comprising the Dusty Prospect. The JOA contained the following 
clause: “if the cost of drilling and completing the test well exceeds 
$355,000, Operator will bear all such excess costs.” Another clause in the 
JOA provided that “It is not the intention of the parties to create, nor shall 
this agreement be construed as creating, a mining or other partnership or 
association, or to render the parties liable as partners.” Sheppard 
Production then hired driller KlutzCo. to conduct a re-entry and 
sidetracking operation. KlutzCo. negligently damaged the hole, resulting in 
cost overruns and delays. The non-operators sued the driller and Sheppard 
Production, who counter-claimed against the non-operators for cost 
overruns not paid. Which side wins?  
In Smith v. L.D. Burns Drilling Co.,66 the Texas Court of Appeals in 
Waco, considering clauses similar to the ones above in a JOA (form vintage 
unstated), held that no partnership was created by the JOA in question and 
because of this, the driller did not have privity with non-operators. 
Additionally, the non-operators only share privity with the operator and 
cannot recover from the driller. As the court explains, “Although the 
investors bore the risk of loss of their entire investment, [operator] 
expressly assumed the risks of all costs overruns. Because the investors’ 
rights as working-interest owners were made completely derivative of 
[operator’s] rights and obligations as the operator, the investors cannot 
individually pursue claims arising out of [operator’s] relationship with 
[driller].”67 Therefore, the express agreement places the risk of cost 
overruns, and the non-operators are not responsible for these expenses to 
either the driller or operator.) 
  
                                                                                                                 
 66. 852 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993). 
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5. Laches 
Problem: In June 2003, Frisk Corporation, as operator, and Lightfoot 
Energy, as sole non-operator, executed a 1989 Form covering the 
Subterranean Prospect. The JOA required the operator to notify the non-
operator of any lease development activities and to obtain the non-
operator’s consent for certain expenditures. Additionally, the operator is 
required to bill the non-operator on a monthly basis for its share of 
expenses via JIBs. The JOA applied to successors and assignors but gave 
the non-operator the right to contest and audit the JIBs within two years. 
In May 2004, Lightfoot Energy assigned its interest to Dylan Energy 
Corporation, and on September 1, 2004, Frisk Corporation assigned its 
interest to Winters Oil. In January 2005, Winter Oil began sending JIBs to 
Dylan Energy Corporation that included lease expenses. Dylan Energy 
Corporation failed to pay any JIBs, and Winters Oil filed suit in 2007. 
Dylan Energy Corporation subsequently declared bankruptcy in 2008, 
having never paid Winters Oil. In December of 2009, Winters Oil sent a 
demand letter to Lightfoot Energy, claiming that Lightfoot Energy was 
responsible for paying the JIBs that Dylan Energy Corporation failed to 
pay. Lightfoot Energy refuses to pay the JIBs, and Winters Oil filed a 
breach of contract claim against Lightfoot Energy.  
Lightfoot Energy raised the defense of laches, noting truthfully that it 
had not been able to examine the JIBs for errors and was not allowed to 
participate in the decision making regarding the operations of the wells. 
Lightfoot Energy was also not able to protect its interests, or review the 
JIBs to make sure the costs themselves were legitimate. Additionally, 
Winters Oil waited to sue Lightfoot Energy until Dylan Energy Corporation 
was long bankrupt, leaving Lightfoot Energy with no way of seeking 
subrogation or indemnification from Dylan Energy Corporation. Do these 
defenses help? 
In Windsor Energy Group v. Noble Energy,68 the Wyoming Supreme 
Court examined a situation very similar to the preceding tale and held that 
the doctrine of laches was an available defense for a breach of an oil and 
gas contract, even though the statute of limitations had not expired. The 
Court noted that, in order to successfully invoke the equitable defense of 
laches, a non-operator had to demonstrate that an operator’s delay in 
asserting its claim was both inexcusable and that the defendant (or others) 
suffered injury, prejudice, or a disadvantage as a result. Delays in sending 
JIBs and subsequent notices that JIBs had not been paid, a lack of 
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opportunity of inspect and challenge bills, a lack of opportunity to 
participate in the planning of the operations giving rise to unpaid JIBs, and 
the fact that the prior non-operator was being held accountable for a 
successor deadbeat were all addressed as elements shoring up the laches 
defense. Windsor raises the interest question of predecessor/successor 
liability for operations under the JOA, addressed in Section VII of this 
article. 
C. Claims of Lessors to Non-consenting Lessees  
The parties who agree to undertake additional operations generally must 
bear the entire cost of the operation. Depending upon the terms of the 
agreement, the party who refuses its consent to such operations may lose all 
interest in the new or deeper portion of the well. This is, indeed, quite often 
the case with horizontal wells that are lengthened or when laterals are 
drilled. With vertical wells, it is more common, as is indicated above, to 
provide that the nonconsenting party acquires a carried interest69 subject to 
a non-consent penalty. These costs include “all production, severance, 
excise, gathering and other taxes, and all royalties, overriding royalties and 
other burdens applicable to the non-consenting party’s share of production.” 
In either case, lessors may receive either no royalty or royalty only after the 
penalty is reached.  
Problem: Gibbons Gas declared that it was going non-consent to an 
operation that later yielded a productive well. According to the terms of 
Article VI.B.2.(b) of the 1989 Form covering the project, Gibbons Gas 
faced a 300% non-consent penalty, during which time it will receive no 
proceeds and, therefore, no royalty will be passed to its lessor, Farmer 
Beard. Farmer Beard sued, claiming to be a third-party beneficiary to the 
JOA and therefore owed royalty. Can the lessor get a share of royalty?  
The Texas Supreme Court in Tawes v. Barnes70 ruled that the lessor of a 
non-consenting lessee was not a third-party beneficiary of the JOA and 
could not sue the consenting lessees for the royalty that would otherwise be 
                                                                                                                 
 69. The term “carried interest” has no fixed meaning, but varies in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement involved. In the case of a party “who goes nonconsent,” the term 
means that the nonconsenting party “will receive none of the proceeds of the production 
until the parties who put up the money to ‘carry’ his interest receive some multiple of the 
costs they have expended with respect to the carried interest.” JOHN S. LOWE, Ch. 3.H., OIL 
AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL (West 6th ed. 2003). If a party is carried “to the casing point," 
it is free of the costs of drilling and testing, but is liable for its share of the costs of 
completing, equipping, and producing. A party who is carried “to the tanks or pipeline” will 
be free of the equipment and completion costs, and liable only for the costs of operation. Id. 
 70. 340 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2011). 
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owed by her lessee. The court reasoned that the JOA did not contain any 
statement or indication of intent to make the lessor of a lessee that goes 
non-consent a third-party beneficiary of the consenting parties’ obligation 
to pay royalty. 
D. Default and Remedies 
Form JOAs provide remedies against deadbeat parties. For example, 
Articles VII.B-D. of the 1989 Form address what happens when a non-
operator refuses to make prompt payments of its share of costs. Execution 
of these remedies can conflict with remedies being taken by creditors 
outside the scope of the JOA.  
Problem: Staley Gas (as operator) and Cantrell Oil (as a non-operator) 
were signatories to a 1989 Form covering the leaseholds and fee minerals 
comprising the Boggy prospect in Texas. Cantrell Oil failed to make timely 
payment of its proportionate share of operating costs. In accordance 
Article VII.B of the JOA, Staley Gas placed a lien on Cantrell Oil’s 
interests in leaseholds, minerals, produced hydrocarbons, and proceeds in 
the Contract Area. Cantrell Oil had previously taken out a loan from Starr 
Bank. As a result, a deed of trust was executed in favor of Starr Bank 
against Cantrell Oil’s leasehold and mineral interests in the Contract Area, 
and other properties, as security for the loan. The JOA itself was 
unrecorded and no memorandum of JOA had been recorded. However, 
recorded copies of the deeds and assignments of the mineral and leasehold 
interests to Cantrell Oil all contained references to the JOA. Sure enough, 
Cantrell Oil defaulted on the deed of trust and Starr Bank attempted to 
foreclose. A primacy question arose in litigation. Does the deed of trust or 
the liens provided for in the JOA prevail?  
In MBank Abilene, N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc.,71 Westwood was an 
operator of a JOA covering two leases. SEI was non-operator. The JOA 
granted a lien to the operator covering the non-operator’s working interest, 
produced hydrocarbons, and proceeds. Outside of the JOA, SEI also 
incurred debt and gave a deed of trust to MBank. SEI later defaulted on 
both its financial obligations to Westwood and MBank. In the subsequent 
litigious tug-of-war between the bank and the operator over the financial 
carcass of SEI, MBank argued it had no notice of the cross-liens in the 
JOA. 
The trial court ruled for Westwood and the Eastland Court of Civil 
Appeals affirmed, holding that the bank took the working interest subject to 
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the operator’s lien, because the bank was put on notice of the lien due to 
references to the JOA in the chain of title in the non-operator’s working 
interest.72 This result would not have been likely in states like Louisiana 
that do not recognize inquiry notice being passed by references to 
unrecorded documents in the chain of title. 
Problem: Mullins Oil was designated the operator of the Dead Man 
Project, which was covered by a unit agreement creating cross liens among 
the signatories. Clayton Gas and other non-operators consented to share in 
proportionate costs and production. Mullins Oil drilled the Initial Well (as 
defined in the unit agreement) that turned out dry. Mullins Oil sent the non-
operators JIBs for their expenses. Clayton Gas, unhappy with the way 
things had gone, refused to pay. Mullins Oil initiated a lien on Clayton 
Gas’ interest and foreclosed. However, the Dead Man Project was now 
considered entirely unprospective and Clayton Gas’ interest was essentially 
worthless. Can Clayton Gas be held personally liable for his debt to 
Mullins Oil? 
In Tiger Flats Prod. Co. v. Oklahoma Petroleum Extracting Co.,73 Tiger 
Flats Prod. Co. was designated operator at the Dutcher Unit. Several non-
operators, including the optimistically-named OPEC, watched while Tiger 
Flats drilled a dry first well. OPEC refused to pay its share and Tiger Flats 
initiated a lien on OPEC’s WI and foreclosed. As is very common in such 
suits, OPEC counterclaimed that Tiger failed to operate in a prudent 
manner. OPEC’s leaseholds, however, were now nearly worthless. The Plan 
of Unitization for the Dutcher Unit expressly created cross-liens and 
provided that the liens could be foreclosed at any time in the same manner 
and with the same effect as mechanics and materialmen’s liens. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the non-operator may be held 
personally liable “in the event that the amount derived from the value of 
foreclosure of lien on the leasehold interest is insufficient to pay the 
claim.”74 
  
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Enduro Oil Co. v. Parish & Ellison, 834 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (As in MBank, the court in Enduro recognized the operator 
lien in a JOA as being prior in right to a subsequent lien when the owner of the subsequent 
lien took its security interest with inquiry notice of the operator’s lien.) 
 73. 711 P.2d 106 (Okla. 1985). 
 74. Id. at 107. 
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III. Successor Liability and Bankruptcy  
A. Successor Liability 
Perhaps the most important purpose of a JOA is to provide a contractual 
framework to efficiently develop oil and gas leaseholds and fee interests 
while protecting against the imputed liability associated with mining 
partnerships and joint ventures.75  
Oil and gas practice and usage support the proposition that, even before 
the metastasizing of Form JOAs, operating agreements generally do not 
provide for continuing liability to shadow a party once that signatory had 
assigned its interest.76 Relatively recently, however, the Supreme Court of 
Texas, in a poorly reasoned and decided case, opened the door on assignor 
liability with regard to leasehold interests included in the Contract Area of 
an offshore model form JOA77 with the decision of Seagull v. Eland.78 
Seagull v. Eland involved two JOAs wherein a non-operator, Eland Energy, 
Inc., assigned its working interest to Nor-Tex Gas Corporation, which 
subsequently went bankrupt. Seagull Energy Exploration & Production, 
Inc., co-lessee, was operator under both JOAs, and went after Eland for its 
assignee’s debt. Citing several landlord-tenant cases and contractual 
litigation—but no actual oil and gas cases—the Supreme Court imposed 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See, e.g., Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. 1977); Berchelmann v. W. 
Co., 363 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) citing 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962). See also SMITH AND 
WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS, supra note 2 at § 17.3[A][2]. 
 76. See 2 Howard Williams & Charles Meyers, OIL AND GAS LAW § 503.2, at 582 
(Patrick Martin & Bruce Kramer eds., 2007) (1959); Fabeńe Welch, The Boomerang: 
Transferring Residual Liabilities Towards the End of the Lease, in STATE BAR OF TEX. 22ND 
ANNUAL ADVANCED OIL, GAS & ENERGY RESOURCE LAW COURSE 7-4 (2004). See also Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus. Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521-522 (Tex. 1995) (Court allows 
evidence of trade usage to interpret contractual terms); Energen Res. MAQ, Inc. v. 
Dalbosco, 23 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (where a 
contract is silent on a matter that needs to be explained by evidence, trade usage is 
admissible to show the intent of the parties); Intratex Gas Co. v. Puckett, 886 S.W.2d 274, 
277-78 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ) (when interpreting an unambiguous contractual 
term, the commercial context behind the contract should be considered, along with industry 
practice). 
 77. The AAPL has crafted and released for public use multiple Form JOAs specifically 
designed for offshore work, including the Model Form 2000 Offshore (Shallow Water), 
Operating Agreement, Offshore (Deep Water), and Offshore (Deep Water) Operating 
Agreement 2006. 
 78. Seagull, 207 S.W.3d 342. For an extensive description of this misguided case and its 
ramifications, see Christopher Kulander and David Lauritzen, A Flock of Trouble: Liability 
Under Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements After Seagull v. Eland, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 212 (2008).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
198 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 1 
  
liability under the two JOAs to the prior non-operating working interest 
owner Eland who had assigned its interest to the current defaulting non-
operator years earlier.  
That such an interpretation of JOAs is against the intent of the original 
parties to the agreement—and to the oil and gas industry as a whole—is 
axiomatic to every commentator found.79 The functional point is that the 
Court considered the form language of the JOA insufficient to absolve 
assignors of their leasehold interests within the Contract Area of the JOA 
from liability. Contrary to the expectation of most, who assume that by 
assigning all their interest in the oil and gas leaseholds that comprise a 
portion of the Contract Area of the JOA they have removed themselves 
from further liability for subsequent actions by the assignees, such liability 
could indeed live on if the lease assignment does not clearly remove the 
spectre of continuing liability. 
As a result of Seagull, language is sometimes added to the additional 
provisions portion of JOAs to protect predecessors in title from being 
targeted for non-payment of amounts owed by their successors in title. To 
limit such liability, consider using language similar to the following in the 
custom provisions: 
 “Upon and after the Effective Date of this [JOA], no Operator or Non-
operator shall be liable for, or bear any responsibility for any costs, debts, 
claims, judgments, fines, levies, obligations or services subsequently 
incurred and arising from or related to operations under this [JOA], or for 
any AFE, JIB, Drilling Unit agreement or other agreements that may now 
or in the future encumber the Contract Area or, if applicable, any AMI that 
now or in the future encompass all or a portion of the leasehold and/or 
borehole interests and/or other interests in the Contract Area after the 
effective date of the leasehold interest of any Operator or Non-operator 
encompassed by this Agreement. Any subsequent transferee of such an 
ownership interest in any leasehold and/or borehole interest assigned shall 
effect a novation of the transferor as to any costs attributable to this [JOA] 
and any unit agreement, unitization agreements, pooling agreements, or 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See 2 Williams & Meyers, Oil & Gas Law § 503.2 (2005) citing the appellate 
decision overturned by the Texas Supreme court; Welch, supra note 175; Michel Curry, A 
Look at the Maintenance of Uniform Interest in Joint Operating Provisions, 24TH ANNUAL 
ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND ENERGY RESOURCES LAW COURSE, State Bar of Texas (2006); see 
also Kulander and Lauritzen, supra note 176. 
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other agreements that may encompass all or a portion of the Contract 
Area.”80  
B. Accrual of Plugging and Abandonment Liabilities  
Timing of accrual of expenses for plugging and abandonment costs is 
important when considering whether the potential liability for associated 
costs was assigned or not, even in light of language designed to elude the 
pitfall set up by Seagull as described immediately above. If the costs accrue 
before the assignment, such costs still might come back to haunt the 
original assignor of the leasehold.  
Problem: Garcia Gas, operator, and Mydland Energy, non-operator, 
were parties to a 1989 Form. After signing the JOA, five wells were drilled 
within the JOA’s Contract Area after the required drilling permits were 
issued from the state oil and gas commission. Through a series of mense 
conveyances, Garcia Gas’s interest ended up in the possession of Hunter 
Oil while Mydland Energy’s interest ended up in the possession of Pigpen 
Petroleum. The five wells then ceased production. Immediately after, 
Pigpen Petroleum filed for bankruptcy protection, preventing Hunter Oil 
from getting Pigpen’s proportionate share of the plugging and 
abandonment costs of the five wells. Hunter Oil then sued Mydland Energy, 
going up the assignment chain, for Pigpen’s portion of the plugging costs. 
The JOA contained the exculpatory language suggested above arising from 
the Seagull case as an additional provision in Article XVI. Does this 
language prevent liability for Pigpen’s portion of the plugging and 
abandonment costs from attaching to Mydland?   
In GOM Shelf, LLC v. Sun Operating Limited Partnership,81 the court 
held that the obligations to plug and abandon a wellbore on a federal lease 
accrued at the time the party who later assigned their leasehold rights 
became either a lessee or an owner of the operating rights. Therefore, a 
practitioner drafting language in an assignment of oil and gas properties 
should consider adding language that expressly relieves the assignor of all 
costs and liabilities associated with plugging, abandonment and remediation 
of any wells then existing or thereafter drilled on the assigned leaseholds. 
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C. Bankruptcy 
Often, looming behind a recalcitrant operator or other contentious 
relationship among parties to a JOA is the specter of bankruptcy. For 
example, if an operator is not replaced prior to bankruptcy, the automatic 
stay of bankruptcy may suspend rights normally held by to non-operators 
and contractors. Bankruptcy courts largely agree that JOAs are executory 
contracts. In Wilson v. TXO Production Corporation,82 the court held that 
both parties had continuing obligations under an operating agreement so 
long as oil and gas was being produced from the wells subject to the 
operating agreement. Even if no further exploration or production activities 
were conducted under the JOA, the JOA was still considered an executory 
contract that could be disavowed.  
Specifically, executory contracts are subject to the provisions of 11 
U.S.C. § 365. Section 365(a) states that, subject to the approval of the 
bankruptcy court, a trustee may assume or reject any executory contract. 
Section 365(d)(2) provides that “the [bankruptcy] trustee may assume or 
reject an executory contract…at any time before the confirmation of a 
[reorganization] plan.” Since typically no such reorganization plan exists 
with regard to curing defaults or providing compensation for the default—
even any adequate assurance of future performance under the executory 
contract—the debtor or its trustee can decide whether to disavow the JOA.  
Therefore, since the JOA is executory, the trustee may reject it. If 
rejected, the operator and the bankrupt non-operator become co-tenants, 
with the bankrupt entity as an owner of part of the working interest 
unaffected by the JOA.83 In essence, the acreage of the debtor drops out of 
the acreage covered by the JOA. If producing wells are on acreage leased 
exclusively by the debtor, the non-bankrupt JOA signatories can then join 
the scrum of unsecured creditors at the bankruptcy court seeking their cut of 
production and personal property associated with production—platforms, 
tank batteries and gathering systems. Also, if the JOA acreage is held by 
production exclusively located on acreage entirely leased by a bankrupt 
debtor that disavows the JOA, the non-bankrupt co-tenants may be left 
scrambling to keep their own leases through the Continuous Operation 
clauses of their own leases or some other contrivance. 
If the operator files for bankruptcy, Form JOAs typically provide that the 
filing doubles as a resignation of the operatorship. This automatic 
resignation, however, could possibly be ruled a violation of the automatic 
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stay that is triggered under federal bankruptcy laws. Recognizing this, JOAs 
typically provide that should an operator file for bankruptcy protection, the 
operator and non-operators will together comprise an interim operating 
committee until that time when the operator either accepts or rejects the 
JOA. Some Form JOAs provide that the interim operating committee must 
approve actions by an affirmative vote of two or more parties owning a 
majority interest based on the interests shown on Exhibit A. 
Even if the debtor does not reject the JOA, problems exist. Parties in 
bankruptcy typically have either a trustee appointed by the court or a chief 
restructuring officer appointed on recommendation of the debtor if a 
recovery plan is presented to and accepted by the bankruptcy court. 
Convincing a bankruptcy trustee or a chief restructuring officer to accept 
the risks associated with reworking or deepening a well, to say nothing of 
entirely new or prospective operations, is different than dealing with an oil 
and gas businessman.  
Bankruptcy laws are largely immune to certain contractual stipulations. 
Even if the JOA is not rejected, contractual agreements to disallow a party 
to enter bankruptcy have been found unenforceable.84 Bankruptcy courts 
may unwind as a preference AFEs in some cases of alleged favoritism if 
they were made within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing as provided by 
United States Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 547, or even further back if the 
AFE could be argued to somehow benefit certain “insiders” such as family 
members and close business contacts of the debtor, at the expense of other 
creditors.  
IV. Gas Balancing and Sales 
Each party to a JOA typically owns a share of production in accordance 
with its proportionate interests in the Contract Area and “shall take in kind 
or separately dispose of its proportionate share.”85 Most controversies over 
marketing have arisen where a party has failed to dispose of its share of 
natural gas or, more rarely, oil. JOAs typically acknowledge this 
contingency by authorizing the operator to purchase the non-operator’s 
share or to sell it for the account of the non-marketing party “at the best 
price obtainable in the area.” If gas is involved, the operator may also have 
the right to treat all undisposed production as belonging to it, in which 
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event the operator will need to make adjustments (or “balance”) at a later 
date. 
Because JOAs typically do not clearly address the most crucial issues 
that arise in imbalance situations, parties to an operating agreement 
frequently enter into a separate gas balancing agreement that is added as an 
attachment to the JOA. A gas balancing agreement sets out the rights of the 
parties if one or more happens to not dispose of its entire share of the gas 
production. Such agreements typically draw upon one of three methods for 
balancing: (1) balancing-in-kind, where the under-produced party takes a 
certain percentage of the overproduced parties’ gas until the imbalance has 
been made up; (2) periodic cash balancing, where the underproduced party 
receives cash at various times during production to pay for the 
underproduction; and (3) cash balancing upon reservoir depletion, where 
the well is immediately brought to balance via a cash payment at the end of 
the well’s lifespan, with the payment equal to all the value of the total 
underproduction. Cash balancing upon reservoir depletion requires keeping 
records for the life of the well. Some courts have viewed the gas balancing 
agreement as the exclusive determinant of the parties’ gas balancing rights, 
and in several instances where the parties have provided for balancing-in-
kind, courts have refused to grant cash balancing, even though the reservoir 
became depleted before the underproduced party could exercise its make-up 
rights.86 
A. Marketing Rights of Parties in the Absence of a Gas Balancing 
Agreement 
The rights of the parties related to the disposition of gas is either 
determined by the gas balancing agreement or, absent that, the operating 
agreement. The 1989 Form provides, in various sections of Article VI.G, 
options to be used if a desired gas balancing form is not completed 
separately. Gas balancing is only necessary if one party, typically the 
operator, asserts to sell all—or a higher percentage than its real interest—of 
the gas as its own. If the non-operators’ gas has been purchased directly by 
the operator or sold by the operator on behalf of the non-operators, then the 
non-operator simply is entitled to its share of the sales price. If no gas 
balancing agreement is used, the JOA’s terms are enacted and they are 
considerably sparser and less clear, causing the courts to invoke contract 
law or common law and equitable precepts to fill the gaps. 
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1. Rights of Underproduced Parties 
Problems have arisen in the past concerning the balance of rights 
between non-operators who enter into a gas sale contract after a JOA has 
been signed and the designated operator who has the right to commit non-
marketing parties’ gas for the accepted “reasonable period” of time. While 
the non-marketing parties certainly have the right of termination, the 
operator will want to have some reasonable advance notice of termination 
so as to cover previous obligations to third parties. Whether or not a gas 
balancing agreement is attached to the operating form, the 1989 Form 
(Article VI.G, options 1 and 2) attempts to handle this tension point by 
requiring non-operators who want to enter into a gas sales contract for gas 
the operator has previously marketed to provide at least ten days written 
notice. 
Problem: Collins Oil was a non-operator signatory to a JOA under the 
terms of which the operator, Gabriel Gas, had both done all the marketing 
of natural gas and overproduced its share of the total interest as described 
in Exhibit A to the JOA. Natural gas prices then rose dramatically. After 
the rise in prices, Collins Oil decided to market its own share of the natural 
gas and demanded a cash accounting of the natural gas Gabriel Gas had 
hitherto overproduced as calculated by either (1) the current “fair market 
price” of the gas or by (2) an accounting in kind. Gabriel Gas responded 
that it would rather pay a cash payment based on the price it actually 
received for the overproduced gas when it sold it before. Lawsuits fly. What 
price must Gabriel Gas use to account to Collins Oil?  
In United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Premier Resources, Ltd.,87 the 
underproduced non-operator sought either an accounting in kind or cash 
accounting based on a price the non-operator put forth as the current “fair 
market value” in the region. The court said accounting in kind could not be 
ordered because the non-operator had not provided any facilities to market 
the gas. Furthermore, cash accounting on the current price was denied 
because the court was hesitant to equate non-operator’s argued “fair market 
value” with the higher price non-operator’s subsidiary pipeline would have 
(allegedly) paid for the gas. The court instead ordered cash balancing based 
on the price actually received by the operator.  
While in kind balancing is feasible when the imbalance is small, cash 
payments are probably necessary for larger imbalances. The timing of when 
the cash balancing should take place is important and potentially 
contentious. If the underproduced party deliberately waits to market its 
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natural gas until gas prices rise, and then demands cash balancing at the 
current higher prices, then it can be argued that the underproduced party has 
violated its obligation under most JOAs to a take and dispose of its share of 
production and should not be able to compel immediate cash payments at 
the current high prices. Any JOA party that forsakes a present sale in an 
effort to make a sale later at a higher price would also seem to have violated 
the general good faith and fair dealing standard implied in contracts.  
In addition, Smith and Weaver, in the JOA portion of Texas Law of Oil 
& Gas, argue that cash balancing upon reservoir depletion may be 
undesirable, particularly if equities in the case favor the non-operators.88 
For example, if the operator operated the well in such a way that inhibited 
the non-operator(s) from being able to make up the unbalance production 
in-kind or if the non-operator(s) could not—despite good faith efforts—find 
a buyer for their gas.  
No simple rule on how the cash payment is to be calculated can possibly 
cover all the possibilities when cash balancing is demanded. The price an 
underproduced party would have received, the price actual received, and the 
ability of both the operators and the non-operators to mitigate the imbalance 
are all factors that must be considered.  
2. Split-Stream Sales and Royalty 
Gas balancing problems can also arise when gas from a single well is 
sold to different pipeline companies via different gathering lines under the 
control of the various parties to the JOAs. The balancing factors that must 
be examined when parties have failed to market gas can also apply to split-
stream sales.  
Problem: Rabin Oil entered into a 1956 Form with Squire Gas in which 
each party to the agreement was to market its own gas from a field 
experiencing declining production. At one point, Rabin Oil’s natural gas 
purchaser could not take all the gas that Rabin sent to it and thus a gas 
imbalance occurred. Rabin switched natural gas purchasers and then 
brought a court action seeking to rectify the gas imbalance through gas 
balancing-in-kind. Squire Gas counter claimed, saying that cash balancing 
at the current price was in order. What result? 
In Beren v. Harper Oil Co.,89 five parties entered into a 1956 Form under 
which the parties were required to “take in kind or separately dispose of” its 
share of gas.  Under the agreement, each party reserved the right to market 
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its respective portion of the unit production. An imbalance developed 
between two parties to the JOA because the first purchaser of production 
for one party to the JOA had a high-pressure line that could not take all the 
natural gas that party could send it. Later, after the under-produced party 
terminated its contact with the high-pressure line and switched to another 
line that could take much more of the produced gas, the under-produced 
party brought an action to restore the balance by balancing-in-kind. The 
court ruled against balancing-in-kind, however, in favor of immediate cash 
balancing because the reservoir was depleting and the underproduced party 
may never had made up its portion. In addition, if the cost of gas was rising, 
in-kind balancing was thought by the court to be inequitable to the 
overproduced parties.  
Royalty payable on split-stream sales can be problematic in Oklahoma, 
where royalty owners are entitled to payment based on the weighted 
average of gas sales from a well. Significant accounting problems are posed 
when parties to a JOA sell gas under different contracts for different prices 
or do not sell their shares of production at all for an extended period. The 
Oklahoma Production Revenue Sharing Act90 places the responsibility for 
accounting to royalty owners on the unit operator, rather than on the 
purchasers of production, and requires each working interest owner that is 
marketing natural gas to pay the royalty share of proceeds to the operator 
every month. The operator then distributes the royalty proceeds and is 
protected against liability if it properly distributes all proceeds paid to it by 
the various working interest owners. Alternatively, a working interest 
owner who is concerned that the operator might not properly distribute 
royalty payments has the option to pay all royalty owners within the 
Contract Area directly. 
3. Triggering Events and Balancing Without a Gas Balancing Agreement 
Unless a gas balancing agreement or another source of pertinent terms, 
such as a custom provision in a Form JOA, provides otherwise, demands 
for gas balancing by an under-produced party may not be successful until 
some triggering event occurs that could result in a derogation of the 
position of the under-produced party to subsequently achieve balance.  
Exactly what constitutes such an event could be contentious.  
Problem: Edge Oil owned a 50% percent interest in the mature 
Flanders field while another non-operating interest owner, Pinder 
Petroleum, owned 5% of the field and took its percentage of production in 
kind. The minerals and leasehold interests comprising the field were 
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covered by a 1956 Form. Edge Oil sold its interest to Lodge Gas, who in 
turn sold that entire interest to Thomas Oil three years later. After the 
second sale, Pinder Petroleum brought suit, demanding an immediate cash-
balancing payment to balance the differences in production due each of the 
signatories of the JOA. Edge Oil retorted that Pinder Petroleum’s position 
had not changed and that the statute of limitations only begins to run when 
one of the co-tenants ousts another co-tenant. Therefore, since Thomas Oil 
had assumed liability for balancing and had honored Pinder Petroleum’s 
right to take in kind, no cash balancing was in order, particularly since 
balancing-in-kind is preferred in the industry. At the time of Pinder’s claim, 
Edge, Lodge, and Thomas were all solvent and no other evidence of any 
possible deterioration of Pinder’s position to successfully claim future 
balancing-in-kind or eventual cash-balancing upon reservoir depletion was 
apparent. Will Pinder be successful in its claim?  
In Harrell v. Samson Resources Co.,91 Conoco was an operator to a 1956 
Form that did not include a gas balancing agreement and that covered land 
in Oklahoma. Conoco and non-operator Harrell had separate gas purchase 
agreements, both with purchaser/transporter Producer’s Gas, while non-
operator Samson entered into a gas purchase agreement with El Paso 
Natural Gas. An imbalance later occurred when Producer’s Gas triggered a 
force majeure clause in its gas purchase agreement with Harrell and stopped 
taking natural gas from Nov. 11, 1982 to Nov. 1984. Still later, Harrell 
called for an accounting because Samson was planning on selling its 
interest in the Contract Area. A disagreement ensued over whether the 
proposed sale was a triggering event allowing an accounting and, if so, 
what kind of accounting would be allowed.  
In the subsequent litigation, the trial court allowed pre-depletion gas 
balancing on the weighted average price actually received. The court of 
appeals reversed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed accounting and 
then interpreted the take-in-kind provisions of the 1956 Form, holding that 
the provisions created “a co-tenant-like relationship” between the parties in 
the operating agreement. At the same time, the Court opined that since the 
JOA provided that each well owner was to take its share of production in 
kind and separately dispose of it, the JOA was “contradictory with respect 
to the legal relationship between the parties.”92  
The Court approved the lower court’s ruling that pre-depletion cash 
balancing of the underproduced parties’ interests was warranted because 
balancing-in-kind was not practical given the uncertain amount of reserves 
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in the field. It found that in order to reconcile the conundrum of co-tenancy 
with the necessity of taking and disposing of their share of production, the 
Court ruled that “the ownership clause creates a co-tenant-lie relationship 
between the parties as to the gas sold, but that each owner has the right to 
separately take and market its own share, subject only to a duty to account 
to the other owners.”  
4. Farmout Agreements and Assignments 
Farmouts and assignments of interests to new parties are often triggers 
for balancing disputes. One key consideration is the solvency of the 
purchasers and whether the previous owner has tried to shift its trust 
responsibilities for accounting to the new co-tenant. Reconsidering the 
preceding example, what might happen if the reserves estimates of the 
Flanders field were very speculative? What if instead of being solvent, 
Thomas Oil was teetering on bankruptcy and evidence existed that its 
operation of the Flanders field has resulted in waste?  
In Unit Petroleum Company v. Mobil Exploration,93 two signatories to a 
1956 JOA were Mobil Exploration and Unit Petroleum, who had 52.9% and 
6.3% interests, respectively, in the Contract Area. Mobil then assigned its 
interest to Amoco, who in turn assigned its interest to Gothic Energy. At the 
time of Mobil’s assignment to Amoco, Mobil’s interest was overproduced 
by at least 158,101 mcf, and Unit’s was underproduced by at least 50,425 
mcf. The JOA contained no separate gas balancing agreement but did 
contain an ownership clause that stated in relevant part: 
“Unless changed by other provision, all costs and liabilities 
incurred in operation under this contract shall be borne and paid, 
and all operations on the Unit Area shall be owned, by the 
parties as their interests are given in Exhibit “A.” All production 
of oil and gas from the Unit Area, subject to the payment of 
lessor’s royalties, shall also be owned by the parties in the same 
manner.”  
Effectively, in order for Unit to have been able to successfully demand 
partial-depletion cash balancing, Unit needed to show that the sale of 
Mobil’s interest somehow derogated its rights to a co-tenant accounting of 
profits. The trial court refused to order cash balancing, finding that “there 
was no act in derogation of Unit’s rights triggering cash balancing.”94 
Furthermore, tolling of the statute of limitations was found to occur when 
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derogation of the underproducer’s rights occurred. The Oklahoma Court of 
Civil Appeals agreed that mere assignment of Mobil’s interest did not 
represent a derogation of Unit’s rights, but remanded the case anyway so 
that the trial court could analyze the circumstances and equities of the case 
to make sure that Unit’s rights had not been derogated. 
V. Preferential Rights to Purchase & Maintenance of Interests 
A. Preferential Rights to Purchase 
The “Preferential Right to Purchase” clause in the Form JOAs has stoked 
much litigation. “Pref right” or “right of first refusal” clauses typically 
require that any party to the JOA that wishes to assign all or part of its 
interests covered by the JOA must first provide the other signatory parties 
notice of the pending assignment and a chance to acquire the property. 
Some such clauses, however, such as the 1989 Form’s Article VIII.F, 
exclude mortgages/deeds of trust, foreclosures of same, or assignments 
made necessary by corporate structure changes from the scope of the pref 
right.95  
Problem: Townes Oil and Nelson Gas owned undivided interests in 
leases covered by a 1989 Form. Article VIII.F is in effect in the form. 
Townes Oil transferred all its interest in the Contract Area to Ely Oil, an 
affiliate entirely owned by Townes Oil, and then sold the equity of Ely Oil 
to an unrelated third company, Lafave Petroleum. Can Nelson Gas enforce 
the preferential right to purchase? 
In Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co.,96 owners of a natural gas 
liquids fractionation plant, entered into a “Restated Operating Agreement” 
containing a provision that plant owners had a preferential right of purchase 
if one of the co-owners proposed to sell its interest. Tenneco, a plant co-
owner, transferred its interest to a wholly owned subsidiary and then sold 
all of its stock in the subsidiary to Enron. The other co-owners wanted the 
preferential right clause to apply and brought suit, alleging (among other 
causes of action) that the transfer violated the preferential right provision. 
Specifically, the other co-owners alleged that the transaction, when coupled 
with the sale of the subsidiary’s assets to Enron, invoked the right of first 
refusal clause that entitled the plaintiffs to purchase the subsidiary’s stock 
on the same terms as offered by Enron. The Supreme Court of Texas 
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rejected the co-owners’ argument that the nature of the transactions should 
be determined by looking to the intent of the parties to the stock sale. The 
Court instead ruled that rights-of-first-refusal should be narrowly construed 
and that in any event the language of the disputed provision in the Restated 
Operating Agreement referred only to a change in ownership. 
Not all courts would agree with the result of Tenneco. In Williams Gas 
Processing-Wamskutter Co. v. Union Pacific Resources Co.,97 two 
companies that jointly owned a gas processing plant had an agreement 
containing a pref right clause that applied if any co-owner proposed to sell 
all or a part of its interest to a non-affiliate. One of the parties transferred its 
entire interest in the plant to a subsidiary, and then created a holding 
company to which all of the stock of the subsidiary was transferred. The 
holding company then merged with a third, unrelated company. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the argument that the latter transaction 
was a “merger” rather than a sale and held that it triggered the preferential 
right of the other co-owner. 
One commentator has suggested that pref right clauses are intended to 
reward risk by giving the JOA participants the opportunity to enlarge their 
interests within the Contract Area in preference to a third party who did not 
share in the initial risks. In addition, the pref right enables the parties to 
exclude new and possibly undesirable participants who may be financially 
weak or have management styles or philosophies that conflict with those of 
the original participants. 98  
B. Limitations on Sales and Purchase Obligations 
Problem: Simmons Oil wanted to sell a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Frehley Production, to independent third party Criss Gas. The package of 
properties and assets comprising the subsidiary included all the stock in 
Frehley Production, a group of oil and gas leases, an AMI agreement that 
Frehley had entered into covering properties in several counties, fee 
mineral interests, cash, and a plethora of purchase contracts and service 
agreements. The purchase price of Frehley Production was split into 
separate components and the value of each portion of Frehley Production 
was allocated and agreed upon by Simmons Oil and Criss Gas. A portion of 
the oil and gas leases—but none covered by the AMI agreement—were 
subject to a preferential right to purchase clause held by Stanley 
Exploration. Stanley Exploration, after receiving notice of the sale, 
informed Simmons Oil that it wanted to exercise its pref right. Simmons Oil 
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responded to Stanley Exploration that if it wanted to exercise the pref right, 
it must purchase all the assets and properties comprising Frehley 
Production. Furthermore, Simmons Oil claimed that the price to be paid 
should be the same as it allocated with Criss Gas. Stanley Exploration sues, 
arguing it should only have to buy the leases covered by the pref right and 
that the price should be the market value as determined by the court. Does 
Stanley Exploration have to buy the whole package? What price should it 
be required to pay?   
In Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc.,99 a Texas court 
of appeals considered the pref right in the 1989 Form as applied to a 
package sale. The holder of the pref right, Navasota Resources, L.P., 
covering a Contract Area referred to as the “Hilltop Prospect” sued the 
working interest owners and the purchasers of a portion of the working 
interest to enforce the pref right.  
Under the terms of the proposed transaction between the seller, 
Chesapeake, and the potential buyer, the buyer would (1) purchase a 
percentage of outstanding shares of common stock of Chesapeake’s 
subsidiary, Gastar, (2) enter into a thirteen-county AMI agreement with 
Gastar, (3) pay $5,012,933.00 for 1/3 of Gastar’s net leasehold acreage that 
was subject to the pref right in a 1989 Form JOA, and (4) pay 44% of the 
costs through casing point on certain test wells in the Contract Area of the 
JOA in order to earn a 33.33% working interest. After receiving notice of 
the sale, Navasota notified the seller that it wanted to exercise its option. 
Chesapeake responded that in order for Navasota to exercise its pref right, it 
must comply with every aspect of the agreement by buying all the stock, 
entering the AMI agreement, pay the cash price, and pay for the promoted 
carry. Navasota refused and brought suit, arguing it only had to buy the 
property. 
Chesapeake argued that the AMI and stock purchase were part of the 
“terms and conditions” of the Hilltop Prospect, while Navasota argued 
these items were separate transactions. After considering the applicable 
case law, the court found that “virtually every authority of which we are 
aware agrees that the holder of a preferential right cannot be compelled to 
purchase assets beyond those included within the scope of the agreement 
subject to the preferential right in order to exercise that right.”100 The court 
held that Chesapeake could not require Navasota to purchase shares of 
common stock or enter into the AMI agreement order to exercise its pref 
right. 
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When the portion of the properties covered by a pref right is part of a 
larger sale, the value of the portion covered by the pref right can be difficult 
to ascertain. Typically, a company selling a panoply of properties will 
allocate values to each component of the sale. The Navasota court noted 
that Texas requires that a seller be held to the allocated price absent 
evidence that the property was worth a different value or was purposely 
under- or overvalued. Other states require the court to determine the “true 
value” or fair market value of the properties covered by the pref right.101  
Preferential right clauses typically allow a party holding the right to buy 
the covered interest but the right must be exercised exactly as stated and 
cannot require preferential right holder to purchase any other unrelated 
items—stock, other lands, equipment, etc. Typically, in order to utilize the 
preferential right to purchase, the parties must be willing “to purchase the 
stated consideration on the same terms and conditions the interest which the 
other party proposes to sell.”102  
C. Maintenance of Interest Provisions 
The 1989 Form’s maintenance provision (Article VIII.D) states that if 
any party should sell, encumber, transfer any of the production, leases, 
wells, pumps, rigs or other equipment inside the JOA’s Contract Area to a 
third party, such disposition must cover either all of that party’s interest in 
the Contract Area or an equal undivided interest in the Contact Area. 
Problem: Elton Exploration owned a working interest in a lease that 
was subject to a maintenance of interest provision in a 1989 Form. Elton 
Exploration wanted to drill a well pursuant to the JOA, but before 
proposing the well, Elton Exploration entered farmout agreements with two 
other investors who were non-operating parties to the JOA. The other non-
operators sued to have the maintenance provision enforced, which would 
allow them to participate with their proportionate shares pursuant to the 
non-consent provisions of the JOA. What result?  
In the unpublished opinion, Medallion Petroleum, Inc. v. Unit Petroleum 
Company, et al.,103 the court upheld application of the maintenance of 
interest clause in just such a scenario. In its opinion, the court noted the 
similarities between the maintenance of interest clause and forced pooling, 
opining: 
                                                                                                                 
 101. For further discussion of Navasota, see Christopher Kulander and Kirk Worley, 
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“In Amoco Production v. Corporation Commission of the State 
of Oklahoma, the court held that the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission cannot force pool by wellbore instead of by drilling 
and spacing unit. In so ruling, the court reasoned that the original 
risk capital investors have a right to rely on the original election 
of participation, and that it was unfair to alter the positions of the 
parties after the initial well was drilled….Joint operating 
agreements, such as the one involved in this case, achieve by 
contract the same objectives that force pooling and unitization 
seek to accomplish by statute.”104 
If this unpublished opinion is any suggestion about how a court might 
address maintenance of interest provisions in the future, parties should 
consider acquiring a waiver from all other parties to a JOA before acquiring 
any beneficial interest in properties within that JOA’s Contract Area from 
any particular signatory.  
VI. Area of Mutual Interest Exhibit/Provision 
To avoid allegedly unequal, complicated, unfair or just plain difficult 
distributions of benefits acquired or generated by one party due partially or 
wholly from joint operations, many JOAs provide that any cash, fee 
mineral, or leasehold acreage received under an assignment, conveyance, 
bill of sale, bottom hole agreement, acreage contribution, or other support 
agreement must be distributed proportionately for the benefit of all parties 
of the JOA. An area of mutual interest clause or agreement, often referred 
to as an “AMI” agreement or clause, typically provides that all parties to the 
AMI agreement will share in any future interests that any party acquires 
within (or partially within) a defined geographical area. AMI agreements 
are commonly included as a separate exhibit to the JOA.  
Courts have held that AMI agreements can be enforced against successor 
parties as a covenant running with the land.105 AMI agreements may not 
always apply, however, to properties acquired inside or outside the Contract 
Area that are unrelated to drilling or other joint operations. As noted by one 
commentator, this situation can leave the parties free to engage in 
competitive lease acquisitions based on information obtained from joint 
operations.106 Outside of questions of whether an AMI agreement is 
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included in a JOA (see Section II above) or questions regarding interests 
acquired because of joint operations without an AMI agreement, AMIs 
generate considerable litigation, often focused on the tensions points of the 
legal description of the physical extent of the AMI’s coverage, conflicts 
between the terms of the JOA and the included AMI agreement, and 
whether AMIs (and pref rights) cover only those interests owned at the time 
of execution of the JOA or all subsequent acquisitions as well. 
A. Description of Contract Area/AMI 
Underlying most conflicts regarding AMI agreements, consent to assign 
provisions, preferential rights to purchase clauses, and rights of first refusal 
provisions is a desire by one party to remove itself from any obligation to 
transfer all or a portion of an acquired asset. Scrutiny of property 
descriptions is often the first step taken by parties hopeful of releasing 
themselves from coverage by AMI agreements, assignment consents, and 
purchase preference clauses. Therefore, one of the most common worries 
regarding JOA Contract Areas and AMI agreement exhibits is providing a 
sufficient legal description as JOA Contract Areas, AMI agreements, and 
similar provisions that do not contain an adequate legal description are 
potentially void.  
Problem: Cash Oil and Jennings Gas were operator and non-operator, 
respectively, in a prospect comprised of several leaseholds and covered by 
a JOA that included an AMI agreement. A dispute erupted over a lease 
acquired by Cash Oil that Jennings Gas claimed was located within the 
Contract Area as described in the AMI. The property description in the 
AMI was composed of a survey with no scale. Furthermore, the Contract 
Area was outlined with a thick black border that did not show the size of the 
tract or the number of acres in the Contract Area. Finally, the AMI plat 
contained no reference to recorded deeds or other instruments. Does the 
property description in the AMI meet the requirements for a legally 
sufficient property description as required by the Statute of Frauds?  
A description of properties in a JOA or AMI—instruments that affect an 
interest in real property—must contain a valid legal description or they are 
void.107 Therefore, knowing what constitutes a legally sufficient property 
description and then measuring up to that standard in a JOA and its exhibits 
is crucial. The description “must furnish within itself, or by reference to 
some other existing writing the means or data by which the particular land 
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may be identified with reasonable certainty.”108 In practice, a threshold 
question when considering whether a particular description meets this 
standard is: could a surveyor go out and easily reconstitute the legal 
description boundary with the information contained in the description 
without drawing upon any intrinsic knowledge? 
The case law of the state where the properties are located in any conflict 
will document scenarios that bracket whether or not a particular description 
meets this standard. For example, in Texas, a series of documents in an 
exhibit that was expressly incorporated into an AMI agreement included a 
plat on which the acreage in question was circled by a black line and a 
commonly-used commercial map that included abstract numbers, survey 
information and block identification was held to comprise a valid legal 
description.109 On the other hand, a survey with no scale with a parcel 
outlined with a thick black border110 that did not show size of the tract or 
number of acres and contained no reference to recorded deeds or other 
instruments was found to not meet the requirements of a valid legal 
description.111 Remember: such instruments are void as a matter of law. 
Often times, the easiest and cheapest method used by those attempting to 
draft a legally sufficient property description without using a prior metes 
and bound survey (or conducting one themselves) is to follow survey/block 
or township/range boundaries, other man-made boundaries such as roads, 
powerlines, or (least desirable) natural boundaries—typically a river or 
stream.112 On the plat, care should be taken to make boundary lines 
describing the outer boundary of the Contract Area thin and precise and to 
include all survey/block or township/range names and abstract numbers.113 
B. Conflict Between Printed Form and AMI Exhibit or Provision  
Care also must be taken so that the language of an exhibit, supplement, 
or JOA exhibit such as an AMI agreement does not result in ambiguity 
when it conflicts with the pre-printed language in the JOA. Expensive legal 
battles arise over such ambiguities.  
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Problem: A 1956 Form was executed by several parties in Our Lady of 
Blessed Acceleration Parish, Louisiana that included typewritten “addition 
provisions.” One of the additional provisions provided that the terms of the 
JOA would cover all oil and gas leases located entirely or partially within a 
Contract Area thereafter defined. In the form portion of the JOA, however, 
was found a clause whereby the terms of the JOA were stated to apply only 
to leases owned as of the Effective Date as defined in the JOA.  
Much later and through several mense conveyances, Bloom Oil and 
Lanier Gas acquired undivided portions of the leaseholds comprising the 
Contract Area of the JOA. Lanier Gas then acquired 100% of one new oil 
& gas lease located partially within the Contract Area. Bloom Oil claimed 
that it was due an assignment of an undivided portion of the new lease per 
the terms of the typewritten portion of the JOA. Lanier Gas pointed to the 
printed portion of the JOA, however, and argued the contractual duty to 
assign only applied to leases owned by the original signatories upon the 
Effective Date of the JOA. Litigation ensues. What result?   
In Clovelly Oil Co., LLC v. Midstates Petroleum Co., LLC,114 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court considered the applicability of the 1956 Model 
Form Joint Operating Agreement to leases obtained in the future. In the 
case, a non-operating working interest owner Midstates Petroleum Co. 
allegedly breached the terms of the JOA with operator Clovelly Oil Co. by 
not allowing Clovelly to claim a working interest in the new mineral lease 
Midstates had acquired in 2008. Through separate chains of assignments, 
Clovelly and Midstates became partners to the JOA, which was executed in 
1972. The JOA contained both a printed portion and a typewritten 
addendum.  
In the opinion, the Supreme Court of Louisiana first cited to Amend v. 
McCabe115 regarding the canon of interpretation whereby any particular 
portion of a contract is viewed in light of all other parts so that, if possible, 
harmonization of all the various parts to the contract is achieved. In reading 
the printed portion and typewritten addendum of the JOA together, the 
Court did not find any express conflict or ambiguity between the two. 
Specifically, the Court found that, while the typewritten addendum 
described the geographic area to which the agreement would apply, the 
printed terms of the JOA expressly limited the agreement to the leases the 
parties owned at the time they executed the agreement. 
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Next, the Court distinguished Amend from Amoco Production Co. v. 
Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc.,116 the Kansas Supreme Court case upon which 
the court of appeals relied. In the Kansas case, at the time one of the parties 
entered into the applicable JOA, that party knowingly misrepresented that it 
held a lease covering a particular tract, when it actually only held rights to 
an undivided portion of the tract. As the parties in Amoco clearly intended 
the particular area to be covered in its entirety by the JOA, and since Amend 
involved no such misrepresentation of lease ownership, the Court found 
that Amoco Production Co. provided no direction to deciding Amend. 
Finally, the Court noted that parties signing a JOA commonly also enter 
into an AMI agreement, which typically provides that the JOA will apply to 
any future leases the parties may obtain within the Contract Area as defined 
in the JOA. In Clovelly, however, the parties had not entered into an AMI. 
Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
siding instead with the trial court in holding that the AMI agreement did not 
extend to the new lease. This case also implies that, at least in Louisiana, if 
no AMI agreement exists, an addendum describing a specific geographic 
area to which the agreement would apply may be preempted by any printed 
terms of the form JOA that expressly limits the agreement to the leases the 
parties own at the time they execute the agreement. 
C. AMI Application to Subsequently Acquired Interests 
If no clear language makes interests acquired by one of the JOA 
signatories after the effective date of a Form JOA subject to a typewritten 
AMI clause, what is the scope of the “Contract Area”? Does it cover future 
acquisitions or just those owned by the signatory parties on the effective 
date?  
Problem: Tucker Oil and Reed Gas were the original operator and non-
operator, respectively, in the Run Run Run prospect that was comprised of 
several leaseholds and covered by a 1977 Form that included a typewritten 
AMI provision governing future acquisition of interests that were subject to 
the JOA. A plat in Exhibit A contained the notation “AMI” on the hash 
marked boundary drawn thereon but not the actual words “Area of Mutual 
Interest.” The JOA did not contain language that expressly made 
subsequent acquisitions by JOA parties subject to the AMI clause. Years 
later and through several mesne conveyances, Tucker Oil and Reed Gas’ 
interests were assigned to Nico Production and Cale Operating, 
respectively.  
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Cale Operating had acquired minerals and leases within the area 
geographically described by the plat in Exhibit A. Nico Production sought a 
judicial determination that the interests acquired by Cale Operating were 
subject the AMI clause, arguing that future acquisitions were covered 
within the broad language used in the Article I definition of “Contract 
Area” (that referred to “all of the lands” described in Exhibit A) and the 
broad description of Exhibit A of the covered lands, the same being “all 
interest of the parties in the land located within the areas outlined” on the 
plat. Nico Production also argued the presence of the typewritten AMI 
clause illustrated clear intent that the JOA would apply to interests 
acquired after 1980. Cale Operating countered (1) that the present tense 
used in the JOA’s recitals and in the definitions of “oil and gas leases” and 
“oil and gas interests” (stating that the signatory parties “are owners”) 
and (2) the lack of the phrase “area of mutual interest” and any reference 
to any future acquisitions in Exhibit A, meant the JOA did not apply to 
interests acquired after execution. Which party prevails? 
In Clovelly, described above, the lack of an included AMI agreement was 
crucial in leading the Louisiana Supreme Court to hold that the JOA’s 
preprinted language limited Exhibit A’s definition of the Contract Area to 
only leases and unleased mineral interests owned by the signatory parties at 
the time the agreement was executed. This case was later cited by a Texas 
Court of Appeals in Anderson Energy Corporation v. Dominion Oklahoma 
Texas Exploration & Production, Inc.117 in its ruling on a dispute with facts 
much like the problem above. The court held that the terms of an AMI 
clause included within a 1977 Form did extend to interests subsequently 
acquired within the boundaries of an area described in Exhibit A.  
The Anderson court first noted that it construed the Contact Area of a 
JOA not just by isolated words or phrases within the JOA and instruments it 
may reference, but by considering the language used in the context of the 
entire JOA and related documents. After noting Kansas case law that 
discounted the recital tense argument,118 the court also highlighted 
Colorado case law that noted it was standard practice in the oil and gas 
industry for parties to enter into JOAs with terms that would apply to 
interests to be acquired in the future.119 Ultimately, the court overturned the 
trial court’s decision and determined that the drafters had intended that the 
Contract Area would include the lands marked “AMI” in the Exhibit A plat, 
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thus making the later-acquired properties within the hashed boundary of the 
plat subject to the terms of the typewritten AMI clause.   
D. Interests Acquired Because of Joint Operations without an AMI 
If the acquisition was made possible by information obtained through 
joint operations, should the party acquiring the interest be compelled to 
share it with the other parties even in the absence of an express AMI 
clause? Consider the following. 
Problem: Laing Gas, operator, and non-operators Pappalardi 
Petroleum and West Oil were parties to a Form JOA covering the leases 
and fee mineral interests comprising the Hard Times prospect. After the 
cross-conveyances provided for in the JOA occurred, each party owned an 
undivided one-third working interest in the prospect. While operating the 
prospect, Laing Gas learned of the presence of a prospective geologic 
feature adjacent to the Contract Area as described in the JOA. Specifically, 
the feature was an extension of the structural high targeted by Laing Gas in 
the Initial Well and it was identified using geological information and 
bottom hole pressure test data gleaned during the drilling and testing of the 
Initial Well, an operation that the two non-operators had enthusiastically 
supported. The Initial Well was located on a lease originally owned entirely 
by West Oil. The JOA did not contain an AMI agreement.  
After completing the Initial Well, Laing Gas acquired a lease over the 
adjacent tract. The non-operators demanded an assignment of undivided 
portions of the new lease in the same percentage as their interests in the 
Hard Times prospect, arguing that Laing Gas only discovered the 
prospectivity of the neighboring tract as a result of their contributions to 
the prospect. Laing Gas pointed to the lack of any AMI in the JOA, and 
claimed it had no such obligation and that all parties had access to the well 
information it used. What result?   
Not having an AMI agreement can put parties seeking a mandatory 
assignment in a difficult spot. On the other hand, some case law suggests 
that prospect data, like the geological and bottom hole pressure data 
described above, are a product of joint operations and should belong to all 
JOA parties.120 It follows then, that if one party had special access to the 
data and used it to obtain the acreage outside the Contract Area, the other 
parties should be allowed to participate upon paying a proportionate share 
of the acquisition costs.121 However, if the information was available to all 
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parties and only one took advantage of it, it is difficult to see that the others 
have any claim. 
VII. Conclusion 
Since the beginning of the oil and gas industry, mineral properties have 
been jointly developed by owners of undivided mineral interests. Joint 
operations spur better efficiency in oil and gas development as resources 
and expertise are pooled.122 JOAs began to be widely used in the 1920-30s, 
often in co-tenant situations.123 JOA have been recognized as a necessary 
set of rules for the parties to coordinate their activities and hence Form 
JOAs have become, after the oil and gas lease itself, the most common 
instrument seen in the upstream oil and gas industry.124  
Like most complex contractual arrangements, the JOA contains 
provisions dealing with a wide variety of specific subjects, can potentially 
include many ancillary agreements, and may reference and incorporate the 
terms of other unrecorded agreements. Many provisions deal with the 
property interests of the participants and govern such matters as 
maintenance of title, liens and encumbrances, and the acquisition or 
transfers of interests. Close attention must therefore be paid to new case law 
as it appears so that not only are new JOAs reflective of the changing legal 
landscape, but also so that existing JOAs do not become problematic at the 
most inopportune times before remedial measures, such as a clarifying 
amendment, can be taken without the threat of immediate litigation limiting 
such options or hurrying their promulgation.  
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